EDIT 12/20/2024: We note that our data appears to have corrupted at some point in pulling this table, pulling the same data for 2021-FL4, 2022-FL1, 2022-FL2. This has now been corrected, alongside relevant analysis. There were no material differences in correction.
December 16, 2024 – Arbor Realty Trust (NYSE:ABR) continued to materially mislead investors during 2024. This report will highlight especially egregious misrepresentations made by Arbor in its Q3 2024 10-Q and earnings call, and CLO trust reporting throughout the year.
- Arbor has modified $5.7b of loans (up 26% month-on-month) and holds ~$1bm of delinquent loans (up 46% month-on-month) in its CLO portfolio. Modified loans represent ~86% of Arbor’s ~$6.8b CLO portfolio, and delinquent loans ~15%.
- Viceroy’s granular analysis of individual CLO loan data over 12 months shows Vast sections of financial data including delinquencies and modifications have been manipulated, adulterated, and/or erroneously under-reported.
- Almost every underlying sponsor’s debt servicing costs are substantially higher than the scheduled interest due to Arbor, and this figure has been growing at an alarming rate. Substantially all of Arbor borrowers have obtained third party mezzanine financing to pay unaffordable Arbor interest.
- Arbor appear to modify spreads for distressed borrowers (a large portion of Arbor’s book), month-on-month, to create a quasi cash-sweep program where borrowers simply pay what they. Arbor does not record delinquencies or modifications on these loans.
- Arbor’s net interest spread has dropped by 13-55% across its various CLOs. The portfolio of distressed loans, is teetering on the edge of a negative spread with over 95% of borrowers unable to afford interest repayments from slim operational margins. The portfolio has an LTV ratio of 85% (approximately a 4.2% cap rate), with Arbor holding the equity stake.
- Only 9 Arbor loans have an underlying DSCR of >1.0. There is no sign of operational turnaround among sponsors, as LTM NOI remains flat across the board, and debt servicing costs increased due to presumed mezzanine financing.
- Arbor’s CFO incorrectly claims that only $15m of PIK accrued in Q3 2024. This is a logical impossibly against reported cash pay-rate and weighted average yield. Viceroy’s calculations suggest between $35m and $37m PIK accrued in Q3 2024, reflecting the severe liquidity constraints faced by sponsors.
- Arbor deceives investors by falsely claiming a robust sales pipeline while its loan book has been shrinking. New originations appear to be substantially the refinancing of existing loans, sometimes to the same borrowers.
The current common dividend remains unsupported by true cash flow available to support it. Arbor is no longer picking up pennies in front of a freight train, it is dropping them.