July 24, 2025 –Arbor Realty’s net spreads continue to nosedive, suggesting a further fall in Q2 2025 revenues. More significant errors in Arbor’s reporting of delinquencies, total debt, and debt servicing costs against underlying collateral have also been uncovered. Arbor’s underlying CLO Debt Service Coverage
May 21, 2025 –Arbor net spreads continue to nosedive, suggesting a further fall in Q2 2025 revenues. More significant errors in Arbor’s reporting of delinquencies, total debt, and debt servicing costs against underlying collateral have also been uncovered. Either the DSCR of Arbor CLOs have
April 24, 2025 – Arbor have closed 2 CLOs last month, announcing that loans will be placed in allegedly cheaper repo lines. We have amended the surveillance reporting of the remaining CLOs accordingly and uncovered more significant errors in Arbor’s reporting of total debt against
March 24, 2025 – Arbor have closed 2 CLOs this month, announcing that loans will be placed in allegedly cheaper repo lines. This report will show that cheaper financing is nothing but a fairytale woven by management. Arbor performance has continued to rapidly deteriorate, as
March 4, 2025 – Arbor’s 10-K is littered with creative accounting and outright incorrect data as its window-dressing campaign continues. This report will highlight the most egregious examples of Arbor’s fabrication of financial data, and contrast this with real performance data from its CLOs. Arbor’s
February 21, 2025 – Arbor’s CLO delinquencies are up 33% month-on-month in January 2025 to $1.1b. Substantially all delinquencies have already been modified, many as recently as Q4 2024. Arbor has modified $4.7b of loans and holds $1.0b of delinquent loans. Modified loans represent ~82%
January 21, 2025 – Despite their best efforts of window dressing (and there was a lot of effort), Arbor’s CLO delinquencies are up 33% month-on-month in January 2025 to $1.1b. Substantially all delinquencies have already been modified, many as recently as Q4 2024. Arbor has
December 20, 2024 – Arbor’s December surveillance report fully captures 75bps of rate cuts and how these rate cuts have not improved Arbor’s borrowers’ ability to service loans. Arbor has modified $4.7b of loans and holds $814m of delinquent loans. Modified loans represent ~80% of
EDIT 12/20/2024: We note that our data appears to have corrupted at some point in pulling this table, pulling the same data for 2021-FL4, 2022-FL1, 2022-FL2. This has now been corrected, alongside relevant analysis. There were no material differences in correction. December 16, 2024 –
October 18, 2024 –Arbor’s systematic can-kicking exercise continues to fail, as Arbor is forced to purchase bad loans from its CLOs and modified loans become delinquent once more. Federal rate cuts have not provided any respite for Arbor’s almost exclusively distressed borrowers, as DSCR of
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