Publications

January 21, 2026 –Arbor’s spreads have nosedived in Q4 2025 despite systematic can-kicking modifications of delinquent loans. Q4 2025 is looking to underperform Q3 2025, which itself was held up by one-off, “equity-affiliate” gains.PLEASE READ IMPORTANT DISCLAIMERArbor Realty Trust’s CLO performance has imploded spectacularly in Q4 2025. In anticipation, we have consolidated some notes from previous earnings and insights from regular CLO filings to present a preview of what we expect.Arbor’s distributable earnings in Q3 2025 were held up by a one-time “income from equity affiliates” line item. The operational adjusted distributable earnings were negative, which also excludes calculated PIK.We expect Q4’s earnings will be substantially worse than Q3, on the basis of underlying CLO portfolio data.

October 30, 2025 – Arbor Real Estate is due to present its Q3 2025 earnings results tomorrow morning. In anticipation, we have consolidated some notes from previous earnings and insights from regular CLO filings to present a preview of what we expect. Earnings & Dividend: Our CLO surveillance portfolio sample continues to falter, with interest spreads taking significant hits as borrowers incur huge losses. We believe this will carry over across Arbor’s entire portfolio. REO & Foreclosures: We expect Arbor’s REO balance, net of disposals, to have substantially increased in Q3 2025. “Resolved” NPLs and foreclosed asset sales are simply to the same or new buys with 100% LTV Arbor loans. Provisions, Modifications & Delinquencies: Vedanta’s intra-period delinquencies increased dramatically in Q3 2025. We identify in our October CLO surveillance report that Arbor appears to have “cured” $350m of delinquencies (due from Nitya Capital) by adjusting the interest rate on the loans to 0.00%.

October 28, 2025 –Arbor’s October CLO reporting data is completely fabricated. We have reported significant misstatements in the past about obvious errors in Arbor’s CLO reporting, however no single month has recorded so many erroneous entries in its CLO reporting. Arbor has cured $350m of EOQ delinquencies by cutting rates on 5 large Nitya Capital CLO loans to 0.00%. Our analysis shows Arbor has manually hard-coded financial data of its borrowers to deflate their returns and improve the financial image of their borrowers. $730m of CLO loans have been modified in Q3 2025 alone. $160m of these are already delinquent again. Arbor has bought-out a loan in its CLO for $83m, and resold it back to another CLO for the same price, removing recorded modifications attached to the loan, and fabricating new underlying asset performance data. There is no underlying operational improvement secured against these loans, no opportunity to transition these loans into agency, or any other feasible lending product, and (obviously) no buyer for these loans at their marked price. These loans are in transition to foreclosures, and nothing else.

September 19, 2025 –MFR net spreads continue to nosedive, DCRS show a slight improvement due to a fall in spread (Arbor revenues). Arbor >30-day delinquencies have remained relatively flat, however we observe a significant number of 90+ day delinquencies are moving off-balance-sheet, presumably into foreclosures. Arbor’s underlying CLO Debt Service Coverage Ratio (DSCR) fell m/m to ~0.66x (adjusting for enormous errors in reporting) to ~0.68x. Underlying asset performance has fallen based on m/m reporting. Reported group NOI has dropped from $226m/a to $222m/a. This is likely due to a few low-earning assets being moved to Arbor’s balance sheet via foreclosures. Arbor has re-modified ~$330m of loans in September 2025. These have all been previously modified. Arbor has modified $3.2b (84%) of its remaining CLO loans and holds ~$1,010m (26%) of delinquent loans. The DSCR of modified loans now fully captures 75bps of rate cuts, and further ~100 and still only sits slightly above ~0.66x. Implied underlying cap rates sit at 4.2%. Any realistic revaluation of underlying collateral values will completely wipe out Arbor’s equity stake of its CLO.

August 6, 2025 – Arbor’s 10-Q marks the first time Arbor appears to be forced to sell foreclosed assets at significant discounts to UPB and outstanding loan balances. Even Arbor’s comically inflated distributable income output is not sufficient to cover its dividend this quarter. Arbor’s reported distributable income, inflated by PIK interest and unrealistic asset valuations,  still cannot cover its dividend. Arbor’s Build-to-Rent CLO was used to bail out real estate projects linked to its CEO and executives, with loans being upsized and maturity dates extended. Some refinancings resulted in increased equity stakes for the Kaufman family, funded by shareholder capital. Arbor has been forced to liquidate foreclosed properties at up to 33% below original loan valuations. Arbor is modifying and re-modifying CLO loans to hide the true rate of delinquency and deterioration. Over $1.8b in modifications were made in just six months, dwarfing the official $1.19b disclosed. Arbor’s SEC filings directly contradict data from its own CLO reporting. Discrepancies in delinquency rates, PIK income, and loan modifications suggest deliberate misreporting or manipulation of key metrics.

July 24, 2025 –Arbor Realty’s net spreads continue to nosedive, suggesting a further fall in Q2 2025 revenues. More significant errors in Arbor’s reporting of delinquencies, total debt, and debt servicing costs against underlying collateral have also been uncovered. Arbor’s underlying CLO Debt Service Coverage Ratio (DSCR) has deteriorated to approximately 0.50x, down sharply from 0.60x at year-end 2024. This includes Viceroy’s corrections to obviously misreported debt servicing costs made by Arbor to the US Bank Trustee. Without corrections, the underlying DSCR would be 0.35x. For context, A DSCR of 1.0x signal the underlying asset operates at break-even; anything materially below that, as is the case here, reflects significant distress and a heightened risk of default and foreclosure. We have found enormous errors in CLO reporting over 18 months, none of which have been corrected or addressed. Delinquent loans have risen sharply since our last update in May 2025, from $750m to $1,048m, an increase of 40%. Delinquent loans now represent >25% of the CLO loan book. $242m of these delinquencies are >90 days. This is fraud. There is no underlying operational improvement secured against these loans, no opportunity to transition these loans into agency, or any other feasible lending product, and (obviously) no buyer for these loans at their marked price. These loans are in transition to foreclosures, and nothing else. The DSCR of modified loans now fully captures 75bps of rate cuts and still only sits slightly above ~0.3x Note: on correcting Arbor’s reporting errors in respect to the underlying debt servicing costs of borrowers, we expect the DSCR is actually closer to 0.5x. Implied underlying cap rates sit at 4.3%. Any realistic revaluation of underlying collateral values will completely wipe out Arbor’s equity stake of its CLO.  

May 21, 2025 –Arbor net spreads continue to nosedive, suggesting a further fall in Q2 2025 revenues. More significant errors in Arbor’s reporting of delinquencies, total debt, and debt servicing costs against underlying collateral have also been uncovered. Either the DSCR of Arbor CLOs have dropped to 0.37x, or Arbor has severely misreported the financial data through US Bank Trustee. We have found enormous errors in CLO reporting over 18 months, none of which has been corrected. The delinquency status of some loans across CLOs has jumped from <30 days delinquent to 90+ days delinquent in the space of one month, immediately following the presentation of Arbor’s Q1 results. This appears intentional. Net interest spreads have collapsed across all of Arbor’s CLOs. In 2022-FL2, the net interest spread is now below 50bps, and many borrowers are paying effective rates below SOFR due to Arbor’s widespread modification practices. There is no underlying operational improvement secured against these loans, no opportunity to transition these loans into agency or any other feasible lending product, and (obviously) no buyer for these loans at their marked price. These loans are in transition to foreclosures, and nothing else.

April 24, 2025 – Arbor have closed 2 CLOs last month, announcing that loans will be placed in allegedly cheaper repo lines. We have amended the surveillance reporting of the remaining CLOs accordingly and uncovered more significant errors in Arbor’s reporting of total debt against underlying collateral. Arbor CLO collateral appears to have undisclosed liens, including mezzanine financing and other Arbor financing. Arbor claims to have moved 2021-FL1 and 2022-FL2 loans to a “considerably cheaper” repo line. We believe this is a lie (which is consistent with management’s M.O.). The repo rate will be revealed in the upcoming 10-Q. Net interest spreads have collapsed across all of Arbor’s CLOs. In 2022-FL2, the net interest spread is now below 50bps, and many borrowers are paying effective rates below SOFR due to Arbor’s widespread modification practices. There is no rate cut on the horizon to save Arbor or its borrowers. There is no underlying operational improvement secured against these loans, no opportunity to transition these loans into agency or any other feasible lending product, and (obviously) no buyer for these loans at their marked price. These loans are in transition to foreclosures, and nothing else.

March 24, 2025 – Arbor have closed 2 CLOs this month, announcing that loans will be placed in allegedly cheaper repo lines. This report will show that cheaper financing is nothing but a fairytale woven by management. Arbor performance has continued to rapidly deteriorate, as ~$600m modified loans are re-modified and granted enormous concessions. Various other loans are placed on workout strategies. ARCREN 2021-FL1 and 2022-FL2 have been wound up, and loans moved to repo lines. Arbor has modified $4.7b of loans and holds ~$750m of delinquent loans and continues to cure the true value of its delinquencies by modifying loans month-on-month. On March 13, 2025, Arbor announced that it closed a $1.15b repo facility to unwind 2 CLOs, claiming that the Repo pricing is “well below the CLOs being redeemed”. This appears to be patently false. Arbor claims that the loans are “primarily non-recourse to the company”. This suggests that the credit risk of the loans are transferred to the repo lender. It is unfathomable that the repo lender would onboard credit risk associated with Arbor’s garbage CLO portfolio at below market rates.

March 4, 2025 – Arbor’s 10-K is littered with creative accounting and outright incorrect data as its window-dressing campaign continues. This report will highlight the most egregious examples of Arbor’s fabrication of financial data, and contrast this with real performance data from its CLOs. Arbor’s loss provisions do not reconcile with widely reported and acknowledged operational headwinds. We believe there is a total of $45m-$55m of undisclosed, unrecoverable paper gains on foreclosures booked against REO assets. Arbor has already encumbered REO assets with mortgages, meaning any realization of these assets would not lead to significant new cash flows. Arbor's SEC disclosures about loan delinquencies, modifications and PIK interest do not conform with its CLO filings. In 2023, Arbor disclosed that it foreclosed on a $217m MF portfolio, which it repackaged and sold back to the same owner for a profit of $22m. Arbor confirmed that it funded $41.7m in additional unsecured lines of credit but did not disclose to whom. The company has increased existing repo line capacity and opened new repo facilities despite being in a loan runoff, and not fully utilizing its existing repurchase facilities. A $22 million loan, issued in 2018 to CEO Ivan Kaufman and other executives, was originally set to mature in June 2021, has now been impaired, raising concerns about its repayment

February 21, 2025 – Arbor’s CLO delinquencies are up 33% month-on-month in January 2025 to $1.1b. Substantially all delinquencies have already been modified, many as recently as Q4 2024. Arbor has modified $4.7b of loans and holds $1.0b of delinquent loans. Modified loans represent ~82% of Arbor’s ~$6b CLO portfolio, and delinquent loans ~17%. Substantially all delinquent loans have already been modified, many as recently as Q4 2024. Delinquent loans are not being cured and are falling further into delinquency. $414m of loans are delinquent over 90 days. Arbor tries to cure the true value of its delinquencies by modifying loans month-on-month. Arbor has modified >$1b of loans in the last 2 months. Substantially all these loans had already been modified, many in Q4 2024. “Debt Service Amounts” due by borrowers have fallen (annualized) $15m over this month on a comparable book size. This is in line with concessions Arbor is making to borrowers through rate-cut modifications. The DSCR of modified loans now fully captures 75bps of rate cuts and still only sits slightly above ~0.6x and down month-on-month. Implied underlying cap rates sit at 4.2%. Any realistic revaluation of underlying collateral values will completely wipe out Arbor’s equity stake of its CLO. There is no growth opportunity to fund multifamily real estate because the entire industry is underwater. This is reflected in Arbor’s shrinking book, the inability of its short-term borrowers to move on to agency loans or refinance their investments, and the stagnant multifamily property market.  

January 21, 2025 – Despite their best efforts of window dressing (and there was a lot of effort), Arbor’s CLO delinquencies are up 33% month-on-month in January 2025 to $1.1b. Substantially all delinquencies have already been modified, many as recently as Q4 2024. Arbor has modified $4.7b of loans and holds $1.1b of delinquent loans. Modified loans represent ~80% of Arbor’s ~$6b CLO portfolio, and delinquent loans ~19%. Substantially all delinquent loans have already been modified, many as recently as Q4 2024. Delinquent loans are not being cured and are falling further into delinquency. Almost $300m of loans are delinquent over 90 days. Loan reserves are down month-on-month. Arbor continues to try cure the true value of its delinquencies by modifying loans month-on-month. Arbor modified $934m of loans against ~50 properties in the month ending January 9, 2025, representing ~16% of its portfolio. Substantially all these loans had already been modified, many in Q4 2024 The evidence of this lies within underlying operational data and the enormous concessions arbor has taken in its interest spreads. Arbor can no longer afford to pay its dividend.