## Arbor Realty Trust - Baloney with a side of flimflam

If investors think Arbor cured all the delinquent loans last month: we have a bridge to sell you.

## PLEASE READ IMPORTANT DISCLAIMER - PAGE 11

February 21, 2024 - On February $16^{\text {th }}$, Arbor announced 2023 earnings and held a conference call. It is obvious that analysts are no longer dancing to CEO Ivan Kaufman's tune. The pantomime theatre has well and truly ended. Like many investors (or nasty short sellers), we left the call with more questions than answers.

The 10-K coincided with the release of Arbor's underlying CLO performance data for February 2024. A cursory glance at this data shows Arbor's almost exclusively loss-making clients are only superficially curing loans through new loans, reserve drawdowns, modifications, and workouts ${ }^{1}$.

We have a lot to say about Kaufman's disregard for our "facts", and his political prowess in non-answer to simple questions. There will be time for that later. This report aims to alleviate lingering questions from Arbor's conference call and 10-K.

- Arbor CEO Ivan Kaufman claims that Arbor has substantially cured their delinquent portfolio, but refused to elaborate on how their almost-exclusively loss-making clients were able to cure those loans.
- Arbor tenants have simultaneously cured $\sim \$ 550 \mathrm{~m}$ of delinquent loan values through simultaneous drawdowns on reserves. If we account for these "cured" loans, Arbor's delinquencies have not decreased at all month on month: they have worsened.
- Viceroy suspect mezzanine financing was also pushed on delinquent borrowers. We will know more on the release of Q1 2024 results.
- Kaufman claims delinquencies in the CLO's are in the $1 \%$ 's. This is objectively false. We believe Kaufman (intentionally or not) was referring to non-performing loans (>60 days overdue), not delinquencies (overdue accounts).
- Arbor's 10-K suggests there were only 4 loan modifications in 2023. We can see dozens of modifications to CLO loans in 2023, and various cured loans now in "workout".
- Arbor's $10-\mathrm{K}$ suggests that the value of <60-day delinquent loans is "only" $\$ 956 \mathrm{~m}$. This is false. Arbor fails to disclose that this figure only relates to delinquencies between $\mathbf{3 0}$ and $\mathbf{6 0}$ days.
- In the CLO alone, \$1.2b of loans were 1-60 days delinquent. This figure increased to \$1.7b in 2024.
- This figure suggests that ${ }^{\sim} 11 \%$ of Arbor's non-CLO structured portfolio is between 30-60 days delinquent, compared to $\sim 5.5 \%$ in the CLO.
- We reiterate our belief that Arbor's CLO is substantially better than its internal book.

The crux of the matter is Arbor clients' use of loan reserves, workouts and modifications to offset borrower operating losses and service interest or extend timelines. Kicking this can is not sustainable, especially as Arbor's new business shrinks quickly.

Without a doubt, Arbor's best asset is its shareholders (that's not a good thing).
More to come on Arbor's financials.

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## 1. The $10-\mathrm{K}$ \& Conference Call

## CLO Performance

Arbor CFO Paul Elenio claims delinquencies of $16.5 \%$ in December 2023 and $26.6 \%$ in January 2024 are now down to 1.3\%.

> Paul Elenio, Chief Financial Officer \& Executive Vice President Sure. Jade, it's Paul. So, yes. So, the delinquency numbers that are reported with the CLOs, as we said in our commentary, were $16.5 \%$ in total delinquencies for December and $26.6 \%$ in total delinquencies for January. Those numbers, total delinquency numbers, are down to $1.3 \%$, as we said in our commentary today, so we've resolved a lot of those loans. Okay? And they're down to, for the January numbers, I have them right here, they're down to $5.6 \%$. $\begin{aligned} & \text { However, those are total delinquency numbers. The industry normally looks at anything } 30 \text { plus and really more } \\ & \text { importantly, } 60 \text { plus. So what we're telling you is those total delinquency numbers that were reported on those days are } \\ & \text { down significantly from when those numbers were reported. }\end{aligned}$

Figure 1 - Arbor Q4 2023 Earnings Conference Call

- Arbor's February CLO data, which we have obtained over the weekend, shows that >30-day delinquencies in the CLO sit at $\sim 6.66 \%$. If we include $\$ 87.5 \mathrm{~m}$ of $>60$-day delinquent (and therefore non-performing) loans that Arbor bought from the CLO at par, this figure rises to $7.8 \%$.
- Mr. Elenio appears to (intentionally or unintentionally) conflate a delinquent loan with a non-performing loan (every NPL is delinquent if $>60$ days overdue, but not every delinquency is a NPL).

For your reference: here is a summarized February CLO delinquency surveillance snippet.

| February Update | ARCLO 2021-FL1 | ARCLO 2021-FL2 | ARCLO 2021-FL3 | ARCLO 2021-FL4 | ARCLO 2022-FL1 | ARCLO 2022-FL2 | Total |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Total \# deals/properties | 43 | 34 | 74 | 92 | 67 | 40 | 350 |
| < 1 Month | 8 | 2 | 4 | 9 | 4 | 2 | 29 |
| 30 Days | 1 | - | 11 | 8 | 4 | 2 | 26 |
| 60 Days | 1 | - | 1 | - | - | - | 2 |
| 90+ Days | 2 | - | 1 | 8 | 1 | - | 12 |
| \# of Delinquent Loans<30 Days | 8 | 2 | 4 | 9 | 4 | 2 | 29 |
| \# of Delinquent Loans>30 Days | 4 | - | 13 | 16 | 5 | 2 | 40 |
| \# of Delinquent LoansTotal | 12 | 2 | 17 | 25 | 9 | 4 | 69 |
| Total deal balance | 671,198,712 | 725,399,761 | 1,448,927,874 | 1,880,412,089 | 1,791,270,750 | 1,045,473,469 | 7,562,682,656 |
| < 1 Month | 51,529,015 | 54,210,000 | 126,440,000 | 186,030,000 | 191,445,000 | 81,700,000 | 691,354,015 |
| 30 Days | 31,250,000 | - | 145,950,000 | 133,995,000 | 32,350,000 | 39,755,000 | 383,300,000 |
| 60 Days | 18,400,000 | - | 14,550,000 | - | - | 87,850,000 | 120,800,000 |
| 90+ Days | 10,802,131 | - | 12,412,600 | 34,500,000 | 29,805,000 | - | 87,519,731 |
| <30 days delinquent balance | 51,529,015 | 54,210,000 | 126,440,000 | 186,030,000 | 191,445,000 | 81,700,000 |  |
| 30 + day delinquent balance | 60,452,131 | - | 172,912,600 | 168,495,000 | 62,155,000 | 127,605,000 |  |
| Deal value<30 Days Delinquency | 7.7\% | 7.5\% | 8.7\% | 9.9\% | 10.7\% | 7.8\% |  |
| Deal value> 30 Days Delinquency | 9.0\% | 0.0\% | 11.9\% | 9.0\% | 3.5\% | 12.2\% |  |
| Deal value >60 Days Delinquency | 4.4\% | 0.0\% | 1.9\% | 1.8\% | 1.7\% | 8.4\% |  |
| Deal BalanceAll Delinquency \% | 16.7\% | 7.5\% | 20.7\% | 18.9\% | 14.2\% | 20.0\% |  |

Figure 2 - Arbor Feb 2024 CLO surveillance snippet
We note that Arbor's delinquencies (where interest is overdue) continues to sit at $\sim \$ 1.2 \mathrm{~b}$. We do not accept Arbor's ridiculous and inconsistent definitions of delinquencies.

As we will show in Section 2 below: Arbor tenants have simultaneously cured $\sim \$ 550 \mathrm{~m}$ of delinquent loan values through simultaneous drawdowns on reserves. If we account for these "cured" loans, Arbor's delinquencies have not decreased at all month on month: they have worsened. This does not even begin to account for opaque workouts and dozens of modifications we can see on the CLO, substantially all of them taking place over the last 6 months.

## There was never a conceivable way in which Arbor's exclusively loss-making clients have simultaneously cured loans. This is lipstick on a pig.

Management was questioned multiple times on how these loans were cured, magically, simultaneously, on the conference call. Did they answer? No.

## Value of Book Delinquencies and NPLs

We note that this section explores the entire structured business, not just the CLO.
The value of Impaired Multifamily loans is up $203 \% \mathrm{q} / \mathrm{q}$ in Q4 2023. As we are seeing in the CLO, lack of performance is compounding quickly. Arbor's allowance for this is pitiful.

| Loans Considered |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| Impaired | Dec-22 | Mar-23 | Jun-23 | Sep-23 | Dec-23 | q/q increase |
| MF Loans Impaired | - | - | 36,377 | 90,070 | 272,493 | $203 \%$ |
| Carrying Value | - | - | 36,202 | 87,995 | 260,291 | $196 \%$ |
| Allowance for Loss | - | - | 5,000 | 17,750 | 37,750 | $113 \%$ |
| Allowance \% of UPB |  |  | $13.7 \%$ | $19.7 \%$ | $13.9 \%$ |  |

Figure 3 - Viceroy Analysis

## Arbor then discloses:

- It held 16 non-performing (>60 days delinquent) MF loans at a carrying value of $\$ 235.6 \mathrm{~m}$.
- It held a further 24 delinquent (" 60 days of less past due") MF loans at a carrying value of $\$ 956.9 \mathrm{~m}$. This is false.

In this challenging economic environment, we have recently experienced late and partial payments on certain loans in our structured portfolio. At
December 31, 2023, these loans included twenty-four multifamily bridge loans with an aggregate UPB of $\$ 956.9$ million that were 60 days or less past due.
Figure 4 - Arbor 2023 10-K
We note that the CLO sample alone represents $\sim \$ 7.6 \mathrm{~b}$ of Arbor's $\$ 12.2 \mathrm{~b}$ structured business bridge loan portfolio.

- In mid-December 2023: the <60-day delinquent loan balances in the CLOs were \$1.2b.
- In mid-January 2024: the <60-day delinquent loan balances in the CLOs were \$1.7b

We note that Arbor appear to again intentionally omit that its "twenty-four multifamily bridge loans with an aggregate UPB of $\$ 956.9$ million that were 60 days or less past due" were actually only loans that were delinquent between 30 and 60 days, because management does not consider that loans <30 days delinquent are delinquent at all.

If this is the case: we can extrapolate the quality of Arbor's in-house loan book from this data point:

- In December 2023: 30-60-day delinquent deals made up \$423m of the ~7.6b CLO (5.5\%).

| December Update | ARCLO 2021-FL1 | ARCLO 2021-FL2 | ARCLO 2021-FL3 | ARCLO 2021-FL4 | ARCLO 2022-FL1 | ARCLO 2022-FL2 | Total |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| Total delinquent deal balance | $\mathbf{7 1 8 , 8 6 9 , 9 9 6}$ | $\mathbf{8 1 3 , 3 9 9 , 7 6 1}$ | $\mathbf{1 , 4 2 2 , 0 3 3 , 1 8 5}$ | $\mathbf{1 , 9 0 0 , 4 6 9 , 4 3 3}$ | $\mathbf{1 , 7 7 3 , 7 2 9 , 7 5 0}$ | $\mathbf{1 , 0 8 5 , \mathbf { 3 5 3 , 4 6 9 }}$ | $\mathbf{7 , 7 1 3 , 8 5 5 , 5 9 3}$ |
| $<1$ Month | $\mathbf{1 1 5 , 0 1 0 , 5 2 0}$ | $91,860,000$ | $\mathbf{1 4 2 , 2 0 0 , 0 0 0}$ | $\mathbf{1 1 6 , 5 5 0 , 0 0 0}$ | $\mathbf{1 8 0 , 1 8 0 , 0 0 0}$ | $\mathbf{1 4 5 , 1 9 5 , 0 0 0}$ | $\mathbf{7 9 0 , 9 9 5 , 5 2 0}$ |
| 30 Days | $31,250,000$ | - | $95,000,000$ | $\mathbf{1 1 8 , 9 9 5 , 0 0 0}$ | $\mathbf{1 5 6 , 8 3 9 , 7 5 0}$ | $\mathbf{2 1 , 1 0 0 , 0 0 0}$ | $\mathbf{4 2 3 , 1 8 4 , \mathbf { 7 5 0 }}$ |
| 60 Days | $18,687,400$ | - | $12,412,600$ | $\mathbf{3 4 , 5 0 0 , 0 0 0}$ | - | $\mathbf{-}$ | $\mathbf{6 5 , 6 0 0 , 0 0 0}$ |
| $90+$ Days | $10,514,731$ | - | - | $\mathbf{-}$ | $\mathbf{1 0 , 5 1 4 , 7 3 1}$ |  |  |

Figure 5 - Arbor delinquent deal balance

- The remaining $\sim \$ 533 \mathrm{~m}$ 30-60-day delinquent deal balance at December 2023 must sit within Arbor's \$4.6b internal portfolio (11.5\%).

Naturally: Arbor management has not provided any performance metrics for its $\$ 4.6 \mathrm{~b}$ opaque internal portfolio. We reiterate that this portfolio appears to be vastly worse than the CLO books.

Lastly: we note that Arbor have moved to cash-accounting on these 30-60-day delinquent loans, in what appears to be a concession to their auditors:

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We are recognizing income on these loans to the extent cash is received. These loans include one specifically reserved loan with a $3.0 million loan loss
reserve and a UPB of $32.6 million.
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## Mezz Finance \& Repo Lines

When pressed on whether or not Arbor has provided the booming mezzanine financing loans to existing clients, management avoided directly answering the question.

## Stephen Laws

Thanks. Good morning. And very nice quarter in a very difficult environment. I know you're working through a lot, like all multifamily lenders are here. I really want to circle back to a couple of your comments. I think, one of the big misconceptions, I think, that I hear from people is, the assumption that all delinquencies lead to a loss. Can you talk a little more about your process? How the modifications and extensions work. Your gives and takes. Are you providing mezz? How much mezz do you guys provide? Are they finding that elsewhere?

## Stephen Laws

Yeah, I appreciate that. The runoff was certainly a positive number, and the rest of the liquidity, I think, actually ticked off a little eventually. So, one last small one on the mezz loans. Do you guys do as our rep investments, people finding that capital elsewhere if it's something they're looking to add.

Figures 7 \& 8 - Arbor 2023 Earnings Call Transcript
Viceroy also suspects that Arbor has financed existing clients with mezzanine loans in order to meet operational and interest obligations. This is obviously unsustainable. We will know more in Q1 2024, but do not suspect management will ever give anyone a straight answer.

As far as funding is concerned: we note that Arbor's repurchased facility has been cut by $\$ 1 \mathrm{~b}$ as of March 2024.
Joint Repurchase Facility. We have a $\$ 3.00$ billion joint repurchase facility that will reduce to $\$ 2.00$ billion in March 2024, which is shared between the Structured Business and the Agency Business, and matures in July 2025 with a one-year extension option. This facility is used to finance both structured and Private Label loans. The interest rate under the facility is determined on a loan-by-loan basis and may include a floor equal to a pro rata share of the floors included in our originated loans. The facility has a maximum advance rate of $80 \%$ on all loans. If the estimated market value of the loans financed in this facility decrease, we may be required to pay down borrowings under this facility.

## A Special Mention



50\% of Arbor's book is now "special mention" or worse.

## 2. A February Miracle - How to Cure Loans

Trustee data shows that 22 loans were "cured" (i.e. were delinquent and became current) in February 2024, collectively reducing the loan balance of delinquent loans by $\$ 774 \mathrm{~m}^{2}$.

It's clear that this was not the result of operational improvements when looking at the still-declining Debt Service Coverage Ratios across the board.


Figure 10 - Viceroy Analysis from CLO trustee data
Investors might think that loan sponsors had stepped up to the plate and contributed equity to bring these 22 wayward loans up to date. This was not the case.

In 15 of these cases, totaling a loan balance of 531m, these delinquency corrections coincided with a drawdown of that loan's reserve balance. We believe these reserve drawdowns totaling $\$ 4.3 \mathrm{~m}$ played a role in curing these delinquencies.

| Cured delinquencies vs Reserve balance change |  |  |  |  |  | Reserve balance |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Property name | Current balance | Most recent NOI | Current note rate | Interest expense | NOI + Interest expense | Jan-24 | Feb-24 | Change in reserves |
| Sycamore Townhomes | 30,000,000 | 166,024 | 9.25\% | $(231,318)$ | $(65,294)$ | 1,184,587 | 1,206,478 | 21,891 |
| St Louis 5 Portfolio | 44,700,000 | 129,849 | 9.10\% | $(339,076)$ | $(209,226)$ | 911,389 | 926,904 | 15,515 |
| Arch Jacksonville | 92,310,000 | 495,350 | 9.10\% | $(700,225)$ | $(204,875)$ | 5,423,270 | 5,437,740 | 14,470 |
| Northbrooke Apartments | 32,500,000 | 63,574 | 9.10\% | $(246,531)$ | $(182,958)$ | 1,996,781 | 2,006,061 | 9,280 |
| Delmar-Savoy Apartments | 17,625,000 | $(39,940)$ | 9.60\% | $(141,040)$ | $(180,980)$ | 1,965,916 | 1,970,341 | 4,425 |
| Julian Square and Arkansas Place | 13,100,000 | 63,997 | 8.85\% | $(96,642)$ | $(32,645)$ | 229,785 | 231,778 | 1,993 |
| The Park on 23rd | 12,600,000 | 37,205 | 9.30\% | $(97,678)$ | $(60,473)$ | 639,207 | 640,840 | 1,633 |
| The Bradshaw | 36,470,000 | $(45,156)$ | 9.60\% | $(291,842)$ | $(336,998)$ | 2,230,919 | 2,230,919 | - |
| Arcos Apartments | 9,800,000 | 51,903 | 9.20\% | $(75,155)$ | $(23,252)$ | 214,602 | 202,514 | $(12,088)$ |
| Peninsula Court Apartments | 14,900,000 | 93,206 | 8.95\% | $(111,163)$ | $(17,956)$ | 505,247 | 491,338 | $(13,909)$ |
| Trio Apartments | 6,300,000 | 48,002 | 9.60\% | $(50,414)$ | $(2,412)$ | 297,505 | 275,176 | $(22,329)$ |
| Sora on Rose | 20,300,000 | 58,905 | 8.65\% | $(146,375)$ | $(87,470)$ | 375,569 | 349,463 | $(26,106)$ |
| Equinox on Prince | 15,198,278 | 38,591 | 9.35\% | $(118,454)$ | $(79,863)$ | 330,685 | 246,564 | $(84,121)$ |
| Country View Apartments | 20,164,000 | 134,007 | 9.30\% | $(156,316)$ | $(22,310)$ | 751,822 | 654,050 | $(97,772)$ |
| The Edge at Oakland | 28,400,000 | 97,391 | 9.35\% | $(221,347)$ | $(123,957)$ | 1,089,251 | 986,339 | $(102,912)$ |
| St George Apartments | 12,500,000 | 63,096 | 9.10\% | $(94,820)$ | $(31,724)$ | 709,919 | 561,211 | $(148,708)$ |
| Maplewood Apartments | 9,300,000 | $(18,097)$ | 9.35\% | $(72,483)$ | $(90,580)$ | 1,003,545 | 830,528 | $(173,017)$ |
| East Tulsa Portfolio | 22,000,000 | 143,358 | 9.65\% | $(176,966)$ | $(33,608)$ | 2,913,496 | 2,738,450 | $(175,046)$ |
| Canyon Club | 17,900,000 | 48,471 | 9.10\% | $(135,782)$ | $(87,311)$ | 1,491,906 | 1,192,258 | $(299,648)$ |
| The Julian | 80,300,000 | 294,072 | 8.85\% | $(592,393)$ | $(298,322)$ | 1,929,556 | 1,495,012 | $(434,544)$ |
| Gainesville Portfolio | 43,900,000 | 88,263 | 8.60\% | $(314,715)$ | $(226,452)$ | 1,488,590 | 911,715 | $(576,875)$ |
| Diplomat Tower 100 | 137,798,333 | 418,309 | 8.85\% | $(1,016,573)$ | $(598,264)$ | 3,114,166 | 2,111,410 | $(1,002,756)$ |
| Amara Apartments | 51,380,000 | 152,480 | 8.70\% | $(372,621)$ | $(220,141)$ | 1,509,323 | $(68,124)$ | $(1,577,447)$ |
| Lantana Apartments | 92,656,583 | 258,859 | 8.75\% | $(675,829)$ | $(416,970)$ | 7,498,960 | $(530,482)$ | $(1,200,000)$ |

Figure 11 - Viceroy Analysis from CLO trustee data3 ${ }^{3}$

[^1]While these drawdowns do not match the payments made on each property for the month, February 2024 saw the largest net $(\$ 29 \mathrm{~m})$ and gross $(\$ 41 \mathrm{~m})$ reserve decrease in the CLO portfolios reserve balance.


Figure 12 - Viceroy Analysis from CLO trustee data
In short, many of these cured loans were not cured by improved operations or borrowers adding funds but in part by drawing down on the reserve accounts. We also believe Arbor's booming mezzanine financing business is largely to cure existing clients: using Arbor's funds to repay Arbor.

This is a limited-use strategy, Arbor CLO borrowers' liquidity runway is becoming shorter by the day.

## Curing mechanisms

A review of underlying CLO data shows that many of Arbor's borrowers are using loan reserves to cover shortfalls in operating and interest expenses.

Loan reserves typically represent the remainder of the loan once the property has been purchased. Their purpose is to facilitate renovations and cover the losses from vacancies while borrowers rehabilitate the property.

In many cases these have been topped up with further drawdowns even while no renovations are scheduled for the period.

Viceroy has noted 3 distinct scenarios for loans where NOI does not cover interest payments.
Scenario 1: Borrowers are funding the shortfalls with equity. This presents on a reserve time series as a NOI shortfall with no corresponding reserve decrease. (i.e. 12708 Shroeder Rd)

Scenario 2: Shortfalls are being funded from the reserve. This presents on a time series as consecutive NOI and interest coverage shortfalls, a decreasing reserve balance, and no further loan drawdowns.

Scenario 3: Shortfalls are being funded with reserves from further loan drawdowns. This presents on a time series as NOI and interest coverage shortfalls coinciding with loan reserve increases and an increasing loan balance.

We note that loan increases are assigned directly into the reserve balance of the loan in an amount roughly equal to the quantum of the loan increase. We can also confirm that NOI figures do not include interest.

Viceroy examined each loan in the CLO on a property-by-property basis, consolidating loan balances and reserves in the case of properties with more than one loan.

## 3．Diving into reserve data

The following charts were made using CLO trustee data for the 13 months from January 2023 to January 2024. We note that some of the 343 properties，for one reason or another，were moved out or into the CLO during the time．

The duration of a property＇s inclusion in the CLO is breaks down as follows．

| Months of CLO Data |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | 11 | 12 | 13 | 14 |
| Loans | 9 | 6 | 13 | 14 | 18 | 12 | 21 | 7 | 19 | 10 | 11 | 5 | 19 | 4 | 175 |

Loans are analyzed at the property level：if a property has multiple loans across multiple CLO tranches these values are consolidated．This is done to avoid double counting NOI and interest expenses．

## Scenario 1：Borrowers funding the shortfalls with equity

This is by far the smallest group of borrowers，but we include it first as it is the primary narrative espoused by Arbor＇s supporters：borrowers are finding equity to make up for losses．


The criterion for this group is no reserve decreases of any kind and a variable number of months of negative NOI plus interest．Only 26 of $\mathbf{3 4 3} \mathbf{( 7 \% )}$ borrowers appear to be covering DSCR shortfalls with equity．

Scenario 2：Shortfalls are being funded from the reserve
This data below represents borrowers who have drawn reserve balances over the last 14－month period， totaling 189 properties out of 343 or $55 \%$ of the total number of properties．

| Months of decreasing reserve balance |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | 11 | 12 | 13 |  |
| 0 | 3 | 12 | 4 | 1 | － | 1 | － | － | － | － | － | － | － | － | 21 |
| 岕 1 | － | 5 | － | － | － | － | － | － | － | － | － | － | － | － | 5 |
| 边 2 | － | 2 | 3 | 1 | 1 | 1 | － | － | － | － | － | － | － | － | 8 |
| $\stackrel{ \pm}{ \pm} \quad 3$ | － | 6 | 3 | 1 | － | － | － | － | － | － | － | － | － | － | 10 |
| $\pm \pm$ | － | 2 | 1 | 1 | － | － | － | － | － | － | － | － | － | － | 4 |
| 25 | － | 3 | 3 | 1 | － | － | － | － | － | － | － | － | － | － | 7 |
| $\pm$ | － | 1 | 2 | 1 | 1 | － | － | － | － | － | － | － | － | － | 5 |
| 葡 | － | － | － | 1 | － | 2 | 1 | － | － | － | － | － | － | － | 4 |
| $\underset{\text { ¢ }}{\text { ¢ }}$ | － | 2 | － | 1 | 3 | － | － | 1 | － | － | － | － | － | － | 7 |
| 4 0 0 | － | 3 | 1 | 1 | 1 | － | 1 | － | 1 | － | － | － | － | － | 8 |
| ざ 10 | － | 2 | － | － | － | 1 | － | 1 | － | － | － | － | － | － | 4 |
| 흔 11 | － | － | － | 1 | － | － | － | 1 | 1 | － | － | － | － | － | 3 |
| $\sum 12$ | － | － | － | 2 | 2 | 2 | － | － | － | － | － | － | － | － | 6 |
| 13 | 1 | － | 1 | 2 | － | － | － | 3 | － | － | 1 | － | － | － | 8 |
| 14 | 2 | 8 | 15 | 18 | 10 | 8 | 11 | 8 | 3 | 3 | 3 | － | － | － | 89 |
|  | 6 | 46 | 33 | 32 | 18 | 15 | 13 | 14 | 5 | 3 | 4 | － | － | － | 189 |

The two clusters can roughly be sorted into＂ideal＂and＂struggling＂borrowers：the upper cluster representing ideal borrowers who make a drawdown for capex while the lower cluster are likely to be perennially loss－making properties using the drawdown to cover operating losses and interest payments．

The lower green cluster is likely representative of borrowers who have been consistently loss making for over 12 months，and continuously draw down on reserves in order to sustain operational functions and cover interest payments．

## Scenario 3: Shortfalls funded with reserves from loan increases

This scenario includes only borrowers who have increased their loans at some time in the 14 months totaling 154 properties out of 343 (45\%).


As we will explore below, borrowers typically do not draw down from the reserve balance each month but make large periodic draw downs. In our view this group represents the riskiest loans: chronic underperformers who tap Arbor for more liquidity despite continuing poor performance.

## Key Takeaways

Arbor have failed to explain how their CLO loans managed to become current while operationally deteriorating. While reserve drawdowns explain part of this mystery, we do not believe that Arbor's sponsors simply found this much equity to plug the gap. The large question mark over Arbor's involvement in borrower mezzanine funding remains unanswered.

Further, a large number of Arbor's borrowers have become dependent on reserve drawdowns to meet their operational and debt service expenses, a situation that is unlikely to reverse.

Below are examples of properties for each scenario followed by an overview of each cured loan.

## Example of Scenario 1 - Preston Hollow

Preston Hollow II has been a perennial loss maker for its borrowers with calculated interest expenses consistently larger than reported NOI since February 2023. Despite this its reserve balance has remained at $\sim 820 \mathrm{k}$ with steady monthly contributions.



We interpret that, given the borrowers of Preston Hollow II are not delinquent, the operating losses and reserve balance increases are being supplemented with equity. We caveat that funding may have been obtained elsewhere.

## Example of Scenario 2 - Seneca Terrace

Like the example above, Seneca Terrace has consistently operated at a loss since at least January 2023 but has made 3 large drawdowns in May 2023 (\$290k), October 2023 (\$302k) and January 2023 (\$246k).


The Seneca Terrace drew down \$290k in May 2023, \$302k in October 2023 and \$246k in January 2024 while running a shortfall of $\$ 30-40 \mathrm{k}$ per month.

These drawdowns exceed the cumulative shortfalls of the months since the previous drawdown but we doubt whether these funds are being used to renovate the property as the "year last renovated" value for the property is listed as 2100 , a value that appears often and probably suggests no plans to renovate.

We interpret that Seneca Terrace has drawn on reserves to cover interest expenses.

## Example of Scenario 3

Meadowood Apartments is an example of the last scenario: a property that runs a monthly shortfall, makes withdrawal from reserves, and has recorded a loan increase. The property has also seen a precipitous fall in its occupancy from the low 90 s to the low 60s.


Meadowood made drawdowns in August 2023 (\$75k), October 2023 ( $\$ 100 k$ ), November 2023 ( $\$ 143 k$ ), January 2024 ( $\$ 90 k$ ) and February 2024 ( $\$ 97 k$ ). During these 14 months it recorded 4 loan balance changes of which 1 was major, a $\$ 663 \mathrm{k}$ increase in July 2023. We question the purpose of these drawdowns given the "year last renovated" which can include future dates, is listed as 2021.

We interpret that, given the borrowers of Meadowood apartments are not delinquent, the operating losses and interest expenses are being met through reserve balance drawdowns.

## Key Takeaways

The recent reversal in delinquency of Arbor's CLO borrowers is not because of improved operations but instead dipping into reserves. This is a limited-use strategy as shown by Lantana Apartments who now have a negative reserves balance and runs a significant monthly shortfall. There are no more rabbits in Lantana's reserves hat.

We have previously detailed how the overwhelming majority of Arbor's CLO loans are unable to meet their debt service expenses, a trend that has only continued in February 2024.

We have included sample data for every loan cured with reserves in Appendix A below.


## Attention: Whistleblowers

Viceroy encourage any parties with information pertaining to misconduct within Arbor Realty Trust, its affiliates, or any other entity to file a report with the appropriate regulatory body.

We also understand first-hand the retaliation whistleblowers sometimes face for championing these issues. Where possible, Viceroy is happy act as intermediaries in providing information to regulators and reporting information in the public interest in order to protect the identities of whistleblowers.

You can contact the Viceroy team via email on viceroy@viceroyresearch.com.


#### Abstract

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The authors may continue transacting directly and/or indirectly in the securities of issuers covered on this report for an indefinite period and may be long, short, or neutral at any time hereafter regardless of their initial recommendation.

Appendix A
Arch Jacksonville


Arcos Apartments

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Property name Arcos Apartments |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Group ID |  | 351077 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Maturity ExtensionsBalance changes |  |  | 0 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | Jan-23 | Feb-23 | Mar23 | Apr23 | May 23 | Jun-23 | Jul23 | Aus 23 | Sep-23 | Oct23 | Nov-23 | Dec 23 | Jan-24 | Feb-24 |
| Current balance | 9,800,000 | 9,800,000 | 9,800,000 | 9,800,000 | 9,800,000 | 9,800,000 | 9,800,000 | 9,800,000 | 9,800,000 | 9,800,000 | 9,800,000 | 9,800,000 | 9,800,000 | 9,800,000 |
|  | 246,388 | 248,753 | 251,118 | 253,483 | 255,848 | 223,468 | 225,833 | 228,198 | 230,563 | 232,928 | 216,967 | 212,237 | 214,602 | 202,514 |
| Reserve balance MoM difference |  | 2,365 | 2,365 | 2,365 | 2,365 | $(32,380)$ | 2,365 | 2,365 | 2,365 | 2,365 | $(15,961)$ | $(4,730)$ | 2,365 | $(12,088)$ |
| Noi Calc |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | 102,731 | 120,624 | 124,549 | 130,281 | 130,281 | 134,586 | 134,306 | 134,306 | 134,306 | 133,834 | 133,834 | 119,361 | 111,648 | 111,648 |
|  | 67,672 | 67,537 | 67,350 | 66,701 | 65,754 | 66,958 | 66,897 | 66,897 | 66,897 | 64,330 | 64,330 | 61,113 | 59,744 | 59,744 |
| Most recent operating expenses Most recent NOI | 35,059 | 53,088 | 57,199 | 63,580 | 64,527 | 67,628 | 67,409 | 67,409 | 67,409 | 69,504 | 69,504 | 58,249 | 51,903 | 51,903 |
| Interest Expense Calc |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Current note rate Monthly interest expense | 7.97\% | 8.18\% | 8.42\% | 8.52\% | 8.65\% | 8.84\% | 9.01\% | 8.96\% | 9.17\% | 9.18\% | 9.16\% | 9.17\% | 9.19\% | 9.20\% |
|  | $(65,121)$ | $(6,837)$ | $(68,745)$ | (69,541) | (70,670) | $(72,220)$ | $(73,584)$ | $(73,198)$ | (74,873) | $(74,967)$ | (74,844) | $(74,889)$ | $(75,075)$ | $(75,155)$ |
| Monthly Shortfall | (30,062) | $(13,749)$ | $(11,546)$ | $(5,960)$ | $(6,143)$ | $(4,592)$ | $(6,175)$ | $(5,789)$ | $(7,464)$ | $(5,463)$ | $(5,340)$ | $(16,640)$ | (23,171) | $(23,252)$ |
| Maturity date | 20250227 | 20250227 | 20250227 | 20250227 | 20250227 | 20250227 | 20250227 | 20250227 | 20250227 | 20250227 | 20250227 | 20250227 | 20250227 | 20250227 |
| Fully Extended Maturity Date | 20260227 | 20260227 | 20260227 | 20260227 | 20260227 | 20260227 | 20260227 | 20260227 | 20260227 | 20260227 | 20260227 | 20260227 | 20260227 | 20260227 |
| Payment Status of Loan | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | в | в | - |
| Payment Status of Loan Year last renovated | 2017 | 2017 | 2017 | 2017 | 2017 | 2017 | 2017 | 2017 | 2017 | 2017 | 2017 | 2017 | 2017 | 2017 |
| Most recent physical occupancy | 99.2\% | 98.3\% | 94.9\% | 95.7\% | 95.7\% | 94.0\% | 94.9\% | 94.9\% | 94.9\% | 87.2\% | 87.2\% | 88.9\% | 88.0\% | 88.0\% |
| Current balance |  |  |  |  |  | 300,000 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 12,000,000 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 10,000,000 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 250,000 | - | - |  |  |  |  |  |
| 8,000,000 |  |  |  |  |  | 200,000 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 6,000,000 |  |  |  |  |  |  | 150,000 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 4,000,000 |  |  |  |  |  |  | 100,000 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 2,000,000 |  |  |  |  |  |  | 50,000 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |

Canyon Club




Country View Apartments

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| $\frac{\text { Loan Analysis }}{\text { Property name }}$ |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Group ID |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Maturity Extensions | 0 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Balance changes |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | Jan-23 | Feb-23 | Mar23 | Apre23 | May23 | Jun-23 | Jul23 | Aus 23 | Sep.23 | Oct23 | Nov-23 | Dec23 | Jan-24 | Feb-24 |
| Current balance | 19,200,619 | 19,200,619 | 19,200,619 | 20,164,000 | 20,164,000 | 20,164,000 | 20,164,000 | 20,164,000 | 20,164,000 | 20,164,000 | 20,164,000 | 20,164,000 | 20,164,000 | 20,164,000 |
|  |  |  |  | 963,381 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Reserve balance | 60,210 | 60,210 | 73,590 | 1,043,661 | 1,043,661 | 1,050,351 | 1,063,731 | 942,127 | 948,817 | 744,473 | 856,680 | 745,132 | 751,822 | 654,050 |
| MoM difference |  | - | 13,380 | 970,071 | - | 6,690 | 13,380 | $(121,604)$ | 6,690 | $(204,344)$ | 112,207 | $(111,548)$ | 6,690 | $(97,772)$ |
| Noi Calc |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Most recent revenue | 214,735 | 230,110 | 230,110 | 230,110 | 235,529 | 235,529 | 236,700 | 238,886 | 239,768 | 241,832 | 234,785 | 234,785 | 234,785 | 237,106 |
| Most recent operating expenses | 89,173 | 90,263 | 90,263 | 90,263 | 117,156 | 117,156 | 121,928 | 110,192 | 110,570 | 112,509 | 101,252 | 101,252 | 101,252 | 103,099 |
| Most recent NOI | 125,563 | 139,847 | 139,847 | 139,847 | 118,373 | 118,373 | 114,771 | 128,693 | 129,198 | 129,322 | 133,533 | 133,533 | 133,533 | 134,007 |
| Interest Expense Calc |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Current note rate | 8.07\% | 8.28\% | 8.52\% | 8.62\% | 8.75\% | 8.94\% | 9.11\% | 9.06\% | 9.27\% | 9.28\% | 9.26\% | 9.27\% | 9.29\% | 9.30\% |
| Monthly interest expense | $(129,188)$ | $(132,549)$ | $(136,289)$ | $(144,764)$ | $(147,086)$ | $(150,276)$ | $(153,083)$ | $(152,289)$ | $(155,735)$ | $(155,930)$ | $(155,676)$ | $(155,768)$ | $(156,150)$ | $(156,316)$ |
| Monthly Shortfall | $(3,625)$ | 7,298 | 3,559 | $(4,916)$ | (28,714) | (31,903) | $(38,311)$ | $(23,595)$ | $(26,536)$ | $(26,607)$ | $(22,143)$ | $(22,236)$ | $(22,617)$ | $(22,310)$ |
| Maturity date | 20240329 | 20240329 | 20240329 | 20240329 | 20240329 | 20240329 | 20240329 | 20240329 | 20240329 | 20240329 | 20240329 | 20240329 | 20240329 | 20240329 |
| Fully Extended Maturity Date | 20260329 | 20260329 | 20260329 | 20260329 | 20260329 | 20260329 | 20260329 | 20260329 | 20260329 | 20260329 | 20260329 | 20260329 | 20260329 | 20260329 |
| Payment Status of Loan | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - |  | - |
| Year last renovated | 2024 | 2024 | 2024 | 2024 | 2024 | 2024 | 2024 | 2024 | 2024 | 2024 | 2024 | 2024 | 2024 | 2024 |
| Most recent physical occupancy | 94.1\% | 90.7\% | 90.7\% | 90.7\% | 95.0\% | 95.0\% | 95.0\% | 95.6\% | 94.4\% | 92.2\% | 93.5\% | 93.5\% | 93.5\% | 93.2\% |


| Current balance |  |
| :---: | :---: |
| 20,400,000 |  |
| 20,200,000 |  |
| 20,000,000 |  |
| 19,800,000 |  |
| 19,600,000 |  |
| 19,400,000 |  |
|  |  |
| 19,000,000 |  |
| 18,800,000 |  |
| 18,600,000 |  |
|  |  |



Delmar-Savoy Apartments


Diplomat Tower 100

| Loan Analysis |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Property name | Diplomat Tower 100351018 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Group ID |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Maturity Extensions Balance changes | ${ }_{1}$ |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | Jan-23 | Feb-23 | Mar-23 | Apr-23 | May 23 | Jun-23 | Jul-23 | AUs 23 | Sep-23 | Oct23 | Nov-23 | Dec 23 | Jan-24 | Feb-24 |
| Current balance | - |  | - | - | 137,798,333 | 137,798,333 | 137,798,333 | 137,798,333 | 137,798,333 | 137,798,333 | 137,798,333 | 137,798,333 | 137,798,333 | 137,798,333 |
|  |  | - | - | - | 137,798,333 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Reserve balance | - | - | - | 5,195,622 | 5,471,032 | 4,430,599 | 3,404,546 | 3,109,943 | 2,413,418 | 1,750,370 | 1,111,282 | 1,111,282 | 3,114,166 | 2,111,410 |
| MoM difference |  | - | - | 5,195,622 | 275,410 | $(1,040,433)$ | $(1,026,053)$ | $(294,603)$ | $(696,525)$ | $(663,048)$ | $(639,088)$ | - | 2,002,885 | $(1,002,756)$ |
| NoI Calc |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Most recent revenue |  |  |  | 422,591 | 498,047 | 498,047 | 660,196 | 710,104 | 710,104 | 801,027 | 846,487 | 914,983 | 914,983 | 993,052 |
| Most recent operating expenses |  |  |  | 300,259 | 315,516 | 315,516 | 366,495 | 391,747 | 391,747 | 440,086 | 459,023 | 525,496 | 525,496 | 574,744 |
| Most recent NOI |  |  |  | 122,332 | 182,531 | 182,531 | 293,702 | 318,357 | 318,357 | 360,941 | 387,464 | 389,487 | 389,487 | 418,309 |
| 1 It erest Expense Calc |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Current note rate |  |  |  | 8.17\% | 8.30\% | 8.49\% | 8.66\% | 8.61\% | 8.82\% | 8.83\% | 8.81\% | 8.82\% | 8.84\% | 8.85\% |
| Monthly interest expense |  |  |  | - | (953,497) | (975,292) | (994,474) | $(989,048)$ | $(1,012,600)$ | (1,013,929) | $(1,012,197)$ | $(1,012,827)$ | (1,015,437) | (1,016,573) |
| Monthly Shortfall |  |  |  | 122,332 | $(770,965)$ | $(792,760)$ | $(700,773)$ | $(670,691)$ | $(694,243)$ | $(652,988)$ | $(624,733)$ | $(623,340)$ | $(625,950)$ | $(598,264)$ |
| Maturity date |  |  |  | 20250331 | 20250331 | 20250331 | 20250331 | 20250331 | 20250331 | 20250331 | 20250331 | 20250331 | 20250331 | 20250331 |
| Fully Extended Maturity Date |  |  |  | 20260328 | 20250331 | 20250331 | 20250331 | 20250331 | 20250331 | 20250331 | 20250331 | 20250331 | 20250331 | 20250331 |
| Payment Status of Loan |  |  |  |  | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | $\bigcirc$ | 8 |  |
| Year last renovated |  |  |  | 2022 | 2022 | 2022 | 2022 | 2022 | 2022 | 2022 | 2022 | 2022 | 2022 | 2022 |
| Most recent physical occupancy |  |  |  | 48.4\% | 56.0\% | 56.0\% | 62.\% | 66.0\% | 66.0\% | 75.2\% | 77.6\% | 81.6\% | 81.6\% | 80.0\% |


| $160,000,000$ |  |
| :--- | :--- | :--- |
| $140,000,000$ |  |
| $120,000,000$ |  |
| $100,000,000$ |  |
| $80,000,000$ |  |
| $60,000,000$ |  |
| $40,000,000$ |  |
| $20,000,000$ | Current balance |



East Tulsa Portfolio


Equinox on Prince

| Loan Analysis |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Property name Group ID |  | on Prince 369965 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Maturity Extensions |  | 0 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Balance changes |  | 1 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | Jan-23 | Feb-23 | Mar-23 | Apr-23 | May-23 | Jun-23 | Jul23 | AUE 23 | Sep-23 | Oct 23 | Nov23 | Dec.23 | Jan-24 | Feb-24 |
| Current balance |  | - | 15,198,278 | 15,198,278 | 15,198,278 | 15,198,278 | 15,198,278 | 15,198,27 | 15,198,278 | 15,198,278 | 15,198,278 | 15,198,278 | 15,198,278 | 198 |
|  |  | - | 15,198,278 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Reserve balance |  | - | 855,745 | 857,254 | 678,741 | 680,864 | 504,582 | 453,064 | 455,188 | 330,685 | 332,808 | 334,931 | 330,685 | 246,564 |
| MoM difference |  |  | 855,745 | 1,509 | $(178,514)$ | 2,123 | $(176,282)$ | (51,518) | 2,123 | $(124,503)$ | 2,123 | 2,123 | $(4,247)$ | $(84,121)$ |
| NOI Calc |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Most recent revenue |  |  | 92,491 | 100,686 | 102,500 | 101,483 | 101,483 | 117,547 | 99,165 | 100,859 | 109,901 | 94,649 | 98,782 | 91,775 |
| Most recent operating expenses |  |  | 47,919 | 48,405 | 47,423 | 46,978 | 46,978 | 47,258 | 47,258 | 47,131 | 47,841 | 51,203 | 52,648 | ,184 |
| Most recent NOI |  |  | 44,571 | 52,281 | 55,077 | 54,505 | 54,505 | 70,289 | 51,907 | 53,729 | 62,060 | 43,446 | 46,134 | 38,591 |
| Interest Expense Calc |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Current note rate |  |  | 8.62\% | 8.72\% | 8.80\% | 8.99\% | 9.16\% | 9.11\% | 9.32\% | 9.33\% | 9.31\% | 9.32\% | 9.34\% | 9.35\% |
| Monthly interest expense |  |  | $(109,146)$ | (110,380) | (111,497) | (113,901) | $(116,017)$ | $(115,418)$ | $(118,016)$ | (118,163) | (117,971) | (118,041) | (118,329) | (118,454) |
| Monthly Shortfall |  |  | $(6,575)$ | $(58,099)$ | $(56,421)$ | $(59,396)$ | (61,512) | $(45,129)$ | $(66,109)$ | $(64,434)$ | $(55,911)$ | $(74,595)$ | $(72,195)$ | (79,863) |
| Maturity date |  |  | 20250605 | 20250605 | 20250605 | 20250605 | 20250605 | 20250605 | 20250605 | 20250605 | 20250605 | 20250605 | 20250605 | 20250605 |
| Fully Extended Maturity Date |  |  | 20270605 | 20270605 | 20270605 | 20270605 | 20270605 | 20270605 | 20270605 | 20270605 | 20270605 | 20270605 | 20270605 | 20270605 |
| Payment Status of Loan |  |  |  | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | в | - |
| Year last renovated |  |  | 2024 | 2024 | 2024 | 2024 | 2024 | 2024 | 2024 | 2024 | 2024 | 2024 | 2024 | 2024 |
| Most recent physical occupancy |  |  | 78.1\% | 80.7\% | 86.0\% | 88.6\% | 88.6\% | 91.2\% | 91.2\% | 90.4\% | 84.2\% | 86.0\% | 83.3\% | 82.5\% |


| Current balance |  |
| :---: | :---: |
| 16,000,000 |  |
| 14,000,000 |  |
| 12,000,000 |  |
| 10,000,000 |  |
| 8,000,000 |  |
| 6,000,000 |  |
| 4,000,000 |  |
| 2,000,000 |  |
| 2,00,000 |  |
|  |  |



Gainesville Portfolio


Julian Square and Arkansas Place

| Loan Analysis |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Proup IDGroume343994 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Maturity Extensions |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Balance changes |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Current balance | Jan-23 | Feb-23 | Mar-23 | Apr-23 | May23 | Jun-23 | Jul23 | Aus 23 | Sep-23 | Oct-23 | Nov-23 | Dec. 23 | Jan-24 | Feb-24 |
|  | 13,100,000 | 13,100,000 |  | 13,100,000 | 13,100,000 | 13,100,000 | 13,100,000 | 13,100,000 | 13,100,000 | 13,100,000 | 13,100,000 | 13,10,000 | 13,10,000 | 13,100,000 |
| Reserve balance | 306,884 | 308,877 | 310,870 | 114,820 | 215,834 | 217,827 | 219,820 | 221,813 | 223,806 | 225,799 | 227,792 | 227,792 | 229,785 | 231,778 |
| MoM difference |  | 1,993 | 1,993 | $(196,050)$ | 101,014 | 1,993 | 1,993 | 1,993 | 1,993 | 1,993 | 1,993 | - | 1,993 | 1,993 |
| Noi Calc |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Most recent revenue | 88,130 | 93,130 | 93,130 | 93,130 | 106,169 | 106,169 | 106,169 | 113,972 | 113,972 | 113,972 | 105,446 | 105,446 | 106,673 | 106,673 |
| Most recent operating expenses | 33,898 | 36,696 | 36,696 | 36,696 | 33,019 | 33,019 | 33,019 | 36,986 | 36,986 | 36,986 | 41,270 | 41,270 | 42,676 | 42,676 |
| Most recent NOI | 54,232 | 56,434 | 56,434 | 56,434 | 73,151 | 73,151 | 73,151 | 76,986 | 76,986 | 76,986 | 64,176 | 64,176 | 63,997 | 63,997 |
| Interest Expense Calc |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| $\frac{\text { Current note rate }}{\text { Monthly } \text { interest expense }}$ | 7.67\% | 7.90\% | 8.08\% | 8.17\% | 8.36\% | 8.59\% | 8.66\% | 8.61\% | 8.82\% | 8.83\% | 8.81\% | 8.82\% | 8.84\% | 8.85\% |
|  | $(83,756)$ | $(86,256)$ | $(88,152)$ | $(89,222)$ | $(91,238)$ | $(93,816)$ | $(94,571)$ | $(94,025)$ | (96,264) | $(96,391)$ | $(96,226)$ | $(96,286)$ | (96,534) | (96,642) |
| Monthly Shortfall | (29,524) | (29,821) | $(31,718)$ | $(32,788)$ | $(18,088)$ | $(20,666)$ | (21,421) | $(17,039)$ | $(19,278)$ | $(19,405)$ | $(32,050)$ | $(32,110)$ | $(32,537)$ | $(32,645)$ |
| Maturity date <br> Fully Extended Maturity Date | 20240928 | 20240928 | 20240928 | 20240928 | 20240928 | 20240928 | 20240928 | 20240928 | 20240928 | 20240928 | 20240928 | 20240928 | 20240928 | 20240928 |
|  | 20260928 | 20260928 | 20260928 | 20260928 | 20260928 | 20260928 | 20260928 | 20260928 | 20260928 | 20260928 | 20260928 | 20260928 | 20260928 | 20260928 |
| Payment Status of Loan <br> Year last renovated <br> Most recent physical occupancy | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | в | - | - | в | - |
|  | 2100 | 2100 | 2100 | 2100 | 2100 | 2100 | 2016 | 2100 | 2100 | 2016 | 2016 | 2100 | 2100 | 2016 |
|  | 84.9\% | 92.4\% | 92.4\% | 92.4\% | 94.0\% | 94.0\% | 94.0\% | 95.4\% | 0.0\% | 88.4\% | 52.6\% | 52.6\% | 86.1\% | 86.1\% |
| Current balance |  |  |  |  |  |  | Reserve balance |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 14,000,000 |  |  |  |  |  |  | 350,000 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 12,000,000 |  |  |  |  |  |  | $300,000$ | - |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 10,000,000 |  |  |  |  |  |  | $250,000$ | - |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 8,000,000 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | - | - |  |  |  |  |  |
| 6,000,000 |  |  |  |  |  |  | 150,000 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 4,000,000 |  |  |  |  |  |  | 100,000 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 2,000,000 |  |  |  |  |  |  | 50,000 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |

Lantana Apartments


Maplewood Apartments


Northbrooke Apartments


Peninsula Court Apartments


Sora on Rose


St George Apartments


St Louis 5 Portfolio

| Loan Analysis |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Loan Analysis ${ }_{\text {Property name }}$ St Louis 5 Portfolio |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Property nameGroup ID |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Maturity Extensions | 0 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Balance changes |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | Jan-23 | Feb-23 | Mar-23 | Apr23 | May 23 | Jun-23 | Jul23 | AUs 23 | Sep-23 | Oct23 | Nov-23 | Dec23 | Jan-24 | Feb-24 |
| Current balance | 42,506,801 | 43,227,034 | 44,700,000 | 44,700,000 | 44,700,000 | 44,700,000 | 44,700,000 | 44,700,000 | 44,700,000 | 44,700,000 | 44,700,000 | 44,700,000 | 44,700,000 | 44,700,000 |
|  |  | 720,233 | 1,472,966 |  |  | - | - |  |  | - | - | - |  |  |
| Reserve balance | 374,880 | 390,395 | 1,863,361 | 1,894,391 | 1,894,391 | 1,413,939 | 1,429,454 | 1,444,969 | 1,460,484 | 1,055,921 | 1,071,436 | 513,720 | 911,389 | 926,904 |
| MoM difference |  | 15,515 | 1,472,966 | 31,030 | - | $(480,452)$ | 15,515 | 15,515 | 15,515 | $(404,563)$ | 15,515 | $(557,716)$ | 397,669 | 15,515 |
| Noi Calc |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Most recent revenue | 468,319 | 468,319 | 468,319 | 468,319 | 468,319 | 468,319 | 468,319 | 491,957 | 491,957 | 491,957 | 486,465 | 481,346 | 481,346 | 510,388 |
| Most recent operating expenses | 283,034 | 283,034 | 283,034 | 283,034 | 283,034 | 283,034 | 283,034 | 718,206 | 718,206 | 718,206 | 458,550 | 362,342 | 362,342 | 380,538 |
| Most recent NOI | 185,286 | 185,286 | 185,286 | 185,286 | 185,286 | 185,286 | 185,286 | $(226,248)$ | $(226,248)$ | $(226,248)$ | 27,914 | 119,004 | 119,004 | 129,849 |
| Interest Expense Calc |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Current note rate | 7.87\% | 8.08\% | 8.32\% | 8.42\% | 8.55\% | 8.74\% | 8.91\% | 8.86\% | 9.07\% | 9.08\% | 9.06\% | 9.07\% | 9.09\% | 9.10\% |
| Monthly interest expense | $(278,914)$ | $(291,209)$ | $(309,837)$ | $(313,465)$ | $(318,615)$ | $(325,685)$ | $(331,907)$ | $(330,147)$ | $(337,787)$ | $(338,218)$ | $(337,656)$ | $(337,860)$ | $(338,707)$ | $(339,076)$ |
| Monthly Shortfall | $(93,628)$ | $(105,923)$ | $(124,551)$ | $(128,179)$ | $(133,329)$ | $(140,399)$ | $(146,622)$ | $(556,395)$ | $(564,035)$ | $(564,466)$ | (309,742) | $(218,856)$ | $(219,703)$ | $(209,226)$ |
| Maturity date | 20240222 | 20240222 | 20240222 | 20240222 | 20240222 | 20240222 | 20240222 | 20240222 | 20240222 | 20240222 | 20240222 | 20240222 | 20240222 | 20240222 |
| Fully Extended Maturity Date | 20260222 | 20260222 | 20260222 | 2026022 | 20260222 | 20260222 | 20260222 | 20260222 | 20260222 | 20260222 | 20260222 | 20260222 | 20260222 | 20260222 |
| Payment Status of Loan | - | - | - | - | - | в | - | - | - | - | B | - | в | - |
| Year last renovated | 2022 | 2022 | 2022 | 2022 | 2022 | 2022 | 2022 | 2022 | 2022 | 2022 | 2022 | 2022 | 2022 | 2022 |
| Most recent physical occupancy | 87.0\% | 87.0\% | 87.0\% | 87.0\% | 87.0\% | 87.0\% | 87.0\% | 87.0\% | 87.0\% | 87.0\% | 81.5\% | 81.3\% | 81.3\% | 79.7\% |


| Current balance |  |
| :---: | :---: |
| 45,000,000 |  |
| 44,500,000 |  |
| 44,000,000 |  |
| 43,500,000 |  |
| 43,000,000 |  |
| 42,500,000 |  |
| 42,000,000 |  |
| 41,500,000 |  |
| 41,000,000 |  |
|  |  |



Sycamore Townhomes

| Loan Analysis |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Property name | Sycamo | Townhomes |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Group ID |  | 351552 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Maturity Extensions |  | 0 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Balance changes |  | 1 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | Jan-23 | Feb-23 | Mar-23 | Apr-23 | May 23 | Jun-23 | Jul23 | AUs 23 | Sep.23 | Oct23 | Nov-23 | Dec. 23 | Jan-24 | Feb-24 |
| Current balance | 28,874,873 | 28,874,873 | 30,00,000 | 30,00,000 | 30,000,000 | 30,00,000 | 30,00, 000 | 30,000,000 | 30,000,000 | 30,00,000 | 30,000,000 | 30,00,000 | 30,000,00 | 30,000,000 |
|  |  |  | 1,125,127 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Reserve balance | 5,473 | 5,473 | 1,147,018 | 1,152,491 | 1,157,964 | 1,163,436 | 1,168,909 | 1,174,382 | 1,179,114 | 1,184,587 | 1,190,060 | 1,195,532 | 1,184,587 | 1,206,478 |
| MoM difference |  |  | 1,141,545 | 5,473 | 5,473 | 5,473 | 5,473 | 5,473 | 4,732 | 5,473 | 5,473 | 5,473 | $(10,945)$ | 21,891 |
| NoI Calc |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Most recent revenue | 289,896 | 289,896 | 292,328 | 291,011 | 291,011 | 291,011 | 279,576 | 286,084 | 279,702 | 279,702 | 269,710 | 269,710 | 302,788 | 302,788 |
| Most recent operating expenses | 134,948 | 134,948 | 135,926 | 134,342 | 134,342 | 134,342 | 146,147 | 145,036 | 143,786 | 143,786 | 141,314 | 141,314 | 136,765 | 136,765 |
| Most recent NOI | 154,948 | 154,948 | 156,402 | 156,670 | 156,670 | 156,670 | 133,429 | 141,048 | 135,916 | 135,916 | 128,396 | 128,396 | 166,024 | 166,024 |
| Interest Expense Calc |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Current note rate | 8.02\% | 8.23\% | 8.47\% | 8.57\% | 8.70\% | 8.89\% | 9.06\% | 9.01\% | 9.22\% | 9.23\% | 9.21\% | 9.22\% | 9.24\% | 9.25\% |
| Monthly interest expense | $(193,076)$ | (198,131) | (211,694) | (214,129) | (217,585) | $(222,330)$ | $(226,507)$ | $(225,325)$ | (230,453) | (230,742) | (230,365) | (230,502) | $(231,070)$ | (231,318) |
| Monthly Shortall | $(38,128)$ | $(43,183)$ | $(55,292)$ | $(57,459)$ | $(60,915)$ | $(65,660)$ | $(93,078)$ | $(84,277)$ | $(94,537)$ | $(94,826)$ | (101,969) | $(102,106)$ | $(65,047)$ | $(65,294)$ |
| Maturity date | 20240217 | 20240217 | 20240217 | 20240217 | 20240217 | 20240217 | 20240217 | 20240217 | 20240217 | 20240217 | 20240217 | 20240217 | 20240217 | 20240217 |
| Fully Extended Maturity Date | 20260217 | 20260217 | 20260217 | 20260217 | 20260217 | 20260217 | 20260217 | 20260217 | 20260217 | 20260217 | 20260217 | 20260217 | 20260217 | 20260217 |
| Payment Status of Loan | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | B | - |
| Year last renovated | 2022 | 2022 | 2022 | 2022 | 2022 | 2022 | 2022 | 2022 | 2022 | 2022 | 2022 | 2022 | 2022 | 2022 |
| Most recent physical occupancy | 76.7\% | 76.7\% | 71.8\% | 73.3\% | 0.0\% | 73.3\% | 71.2\% | 0.0\% | 63.7\% | 63.7\% | 61.9\% | 61.9\% | 58.1\% | 58.5\% |


| Current balance |  |
| :--- | :--- |
| $30,200,000$ |  |
| $30,000,000$ |  |
| $29,800,000$ |  |
| $29,600,000$ |  |
| $29,400,000$ |  |
| $29,200,000$ |  |
| $29,000,000$ |  |
| $28,800,000$ |  |
| $28,600,000$ |  |
| $28,400,000$ |  |
| $28,200,000$ | $\square$ |


| Reserve balance |  |
| :---: | :---: |
| 1,400,000 |  |
| 1,200,000 |  |
| 1,000,000 |  |
|  |  |
| 800,000 |  |
| 600,000 |  |
| 400,000 |  |
| 200,000 |  |
| 20,00 |  |
|  |  |

The Bradshaw




The Edge at Oakland

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| $\xrightarrow{\text { Loan Analysis }}$ Property name $\quad$ The Edge at Oakland |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Group ID |  | 358164 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Maturity Extensions | ${ }_{3}^{0}$ |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Balance changes |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | Jan-23 | Feb-23 | Mar-23 | Apr 23 | May 23 | Jun-23 | Jul23 | AUg 23 | Sep-23 | Oct23 | Nov-23 | Dec 23 | Jan-24 | Feb-24 |
| Current balance | 25,919,252 | 25,919,252 | 25,919,252 | 25,919,252 | 25,919,252 | 25,919,252 | 27,396,257 | 27,396,257 | 27,778,264 | 27,778,264 | 27,778,264 | 28,40,000 | 28,400,000 | 28,400,000 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 1,477,005 |  | 382,007 |  |  | 621,736 |  |  |
| Reserve balance | 460,500 | 460,500 | 460,500 | 460,500 | 460,500 | 463,500 | 466,500 | 469,500 | 472,500 | 475,500 | 478,500 | 1,086,251 | 1,089,251 | 986,339 |
| MoM difference |  | - | - | - |  | 3,000 | 3,000 | 3,000 | 3,000 | 3,000 | 3,000 | 607,751 | 3,000 | (102,912) |
| Noi Calc |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Most recent revenue | 183,944 | 167,020 | 148,232 | 153,552 | 170,976 | 165,443 | 153,233 | 140,323 | 160,717 | 177,419 | 189,663 | 182,517 | 183,075 | 183,075 |
| Most recent operating expenses | 76,762 | 83,358 | 94,388 | 96,867 | 95,913 | 92,526 | 85,905 | 87,459 | 71,441 | 72,805 | 77,234 | 86,735 | 85,684 | 85,684 |
| Most recent NOI | 107,182 | 83,662 | 53,845 | 56,685 | 75,063 | 72,917 | 67,328 | 52,865 | 89,277 | 104,614 | 112,429 | 95,782 | 97,391 | 97,391 |
| Interest Expense Calc |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Current note rate | 8.12\% | 8.33\% | 8.57\% | 8.67\% | 8.80\% | 8.99\% | 9.16\% | 9.11\% | 9.32\% | 9.33\% | 9.31\% | 9.32\% | 9.34\% | 9.35\% |
| Monthly interest expense | $(175,472)$ | $(180,011)$ | $(185,058)$ | $(187,162)$ | $(190,148)$ | $(194,248)$ | (209,131) | $(208,052)$ | $(215,701)$ | $(215,969)$ | $(215,619)$ | (220,575) | (221,113) | (221,347) |
| Monthly Shortfall | $(68,290)$ | (96,348) | $(131,214)$ | $(130,477)$ | $(115,085)$ | $(121,330)$ | $(141,803)$ | $(155,187)$ | $(126,424)$ | $(111,355)$ | $(103,191)$ | $(124,793)$ | (123,722) | (123,957) |
| Maturity date | 20250517 | 20250517 | 20250517 | 20250517 | 20250517 | 20250517 | 20250517 | 20250517 | 20250517 | 20250517 | 20250517 | 20250517 | 20250517 | 20250517 |
| Fully Extended Maturity Date | 20270517 | 20270517 | 20270517 | 20270517 | 20270517 | 20270517 | 20270517 | 20270517 | 20270517 | 20270517 | 20270517 | 20270517 | 20270517 | 20270517 |
| Payment Status of Loan | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | B | - |
| Year last renovated | 2022 | 2022 | 2022 | 2022 | 2022 | 2022 | 2022 | 2022 | 2022 | 2022 | 2022 | 2022 | 2022 | 2022 |
| Most reeent physical occupancy | 95.8\% | 88.9\% | 813\% | 79.2\% | 79.2\% | 79.2\% | 86.1\% | 88.2\% | 92.4\% | 92.4\% | 86.1\% | 87.5\% | 85.4\% | 85.4\% |


| Current balance |  |
| :---: | :---: |
| 29,000,000 |  |
| 28,500,000 |  |
| 28,000,000 |  |
| 27,500,000 |  |
| 27,000,000 |  |
| 26,500,000 |  |
| 26,000,000 |  |
| 25,500,000 |  |
| 25,000,000 |  |
| 24,500,000 |  |
|  | $20^{22^{3}} 50^{25^{3}}$ |



The Julian


The Park on $23^{\text {rd }}$


Trio Apartments




[^0]:    ${ }^{1}$ We will publish a surveillance report similar to our previous reports in the short term.

[^1]:    ${ }^{2} 2$ other loans, Amara Apartments and The Bradshaw were cured due to their sale with the reason stated as "defaulted obligation.".
    ${ }^{3}$ The Lantana Apartments loan balance decreased by 6.8 m during the month with the reserve decreasing by 8.0 m . We believe the difference of $\$ 1.2 \mathrm{~m}$ to be the drawdown for the month.

