Publications

The Chhattisgarh’s boiler explosion is a symptom of Vedanta’s systematic disregard for ESG. It follows dozens of other industrial incidents and human rights violations that the GoI, and ESG mandated stakeholders, ignore.April 16, 2026 – On April 14, 2026, an incident at Vedanta’s Chattisgarh Athena Power Plant led to the death of at least 20 workers and over 36 workers injured[1].Vedanta claimed that the incident involved personnel from its subcontractor NGSL.Media has reported that the cause was a failure in the boiler tube. There are also conflicting reports that it was the main steam pipe carrying steam from the boiler to the turbine.The unit that caused the incident was likely unit 1, as unit 2 was still under commission.The GOI’s Ministry of Power provide annual accounts of the status of thermal power projects in the country. These are publicly available.On July 7, 2022, Vedanta purchased the Athena TPP out of liquidation for Rs 564 crore (~$70m in 2022).From the April 2024 BSR, Vedanta expected the plant to be revived by FY2030-31.From the April 2025 BSR, Vedanta moved up the expected commissioning dates for both units to 2025-26 and 2026-27.Vedanta is a Morally Reprehensible Business with a Dismal ESG HistoryYou can lead a horse to water, but you can’t get the GoI to ever reprimand crony capitalism. Unfortunately, workplace accidents occur systematically across Vedanta’s crony-capitalist enterprise. We have reported on dozens of abhorrent “incidents”, many of which are ongoing, to deaf ears from both the GoI and from Vedanta’s vast number of global institutional investors with ESG mandates.Profits from Anil’s Crony Capitalist empire are transferred, pre-tax, to the United Kingdom via exorbitant brand fees even though Vedanta Resources does not maintain an office in the UK. The GoI simply allows Vedanta to commit what we perceive to be blatant tax fraud.To salt wounds further: the GoI has announced that the Indian taxpayer will fund bereavement payments to the families of Vedanta’s victims.Despite these epic ESG failures and the inability to successfully execute any project on time this decade: Anil’s message across social media channels and public events has consistently been that the GoI should hand over more public assets to Vedanta (ostensibly, a British company), roll back regulation, and self-certify.Anil Agarwal is not a serious person. There will be more disasters. Shareholders rejoice.Questions1.       What happened to the boilers during the work halt (2017 – 2024)?2.       What tests were conducted post 2022? Was the hydro test redone?3.       Why did Vedanta move commissioning from FY2030 to 2025-27?4.       What changed operationally or financially to accelerate this timetable revision?5.       What was the failure mechanism?

Vedanta Resources’ inability to raise debt means it has defaulted on its obligation to KCM or to VEDL. Management is, once again, now lying about it. Spineless VEDL shareholders rejoice.March 12, 2026  – Vedanta Resources’ (VRL) approach to survival is similar to India’s approach to cricket: hope the umpire is on your side. While this has been proven a good strategy to date: VRL has now defaulted on obligations to either VEDL or KCM.Viceroy has tracked VRL inflows and outflows over the past 5 months since HY FY 2026, which shows that VRL does not have unrestricted cash flows to meet H2 FY 2026 obligations to VEDL (in the form of intercompany loan repayment) and KCM (biding investment obligation, per SHA). It has defaulted on its obligations.Whatever the flow of funds, there’s no possible way VRL sent $206m into a bank account in Zambia, while simultaneously having repaid any of its Intercompany loan to VEDL.Suddenly: the non-existent de-leveraging plan looks like a re-leveraging plan. Unfortunately: VEDL and VRL do not appear to have any new assets to pledge, and its lenders are losing interest:VRL intended mitigate default by raising a $500-$600m facility disclosed on the Q3 FY 2026 conference call. It managed to only raise a $80m from Maharashtra in Q3 2026 for the sole purpose of repaying the ICL.VRL subsequently announced an intended $350m VRL debt raise, which was nevertheless severely undersubscribed at only $110m.This leaves two scenarios, both of which are equally embarrassing for VEDL’s management team:VRL defaults on its obligation to VEDL and breaches conditions of its $80m Maharashtra loan. Alternatively, VEDL must accept to modify this loan so that VRL, its immediate parent, can invest in a dumpster-fire Zambian copper mine which VEDL has no interest in, and VRL intends to list on a US stock exchange at $25b (not satire). This may work, given that VEDL’s shareholders appear largely spineless and happily allow management to loot VEDL as they see fit.VRL admits its KCM venture is a total disaster, and that its PR-machine manufactured a ridiculous story to dupe lenders. VEDL is made whole but VRL will lose KCM.Amid this default event: VRL has paid the Agarwals a dividend of $50m. To round things off: VEDL announced quietly that it had cut its FY 2026 EBITDA guidance by ~33%. Looking forward: VRL may find relief in its economically nonsensical “brand fees” charged to VEDL, and force VEDL to announce an outsized dividend in Q1 FY 2027. These inflows cannot carry VRL through to mid FY 2027.

December 17, 2025 – For years Vedanta Resources Limited (VRL) has relied on complex offshore structures  to upstream cash, service debt and falsely reassure bondholders that Indian regulatory risks are contained at the operating level.The Indian Income Tax Department (ITD) has now asserted that the main purpose of the establishment of Vedanta Holdings Mauritius 2 Limited (VHM2L), which holds ~12.6% of VEDL under the VRL umbrella, was to evade tax.The GoI has quantified the alleged tax evasion at ₹1,308 crore ($145m). Penalties of up to 200% can be imposed in addition to repayment of underlying tax owed. An adverse ruling will also constrain VRL’s ability to loot VEDL and service its debt going forward.The ITD has issued 6 statutory demands, held multiple hearings, received multiple submissions, and finally issued an adverse order to VHM2L: none of which was disclosed to bondholders or acknowledged as a risk in the bondholder prospectus. This constitutes a clear breach of Vedanta’s own disclosure policy.The GAAR record corroborates Viceroy’s prior findings that core VRL functions are, in fact, performed by VEDL employees in India, not VRL itself.The record shows that since 2014, VEDL has provided administrative and accounting services to VRL and its group companies for which VEDL is paid $350,000 per year. Against this backdrop, the hundreds of millions of dollars paid by VEDL to VRL lack any credible justification.Viceroy have reported countless, material high-stakes investigations from which Bondholders have been kept in the dark for years. These will continue to pile on to VRL’s books. By all accounts: VRL appears to have resorted to intentionally breaking the law in order to service debt.

December 11, 2025 – Vedanta Resources Limited (VRL) hosted its H1 FY26 Earnings call on December 4, 2026. Unlike prior periods, this call was quietly handled with little public notice, no Bloomberg pickup, and only 3 analysts in attendance. Even in this controlled environment, management faced pointed questions and skepticism about deleveraging that has collapsed. Liquidity is thin, obligations are rising, and management is now seeking a $600m facility just to meet near-term cash demands. FY26 deleveraging was guided down from $500m to $250m – $300m, with management suggesting that the KCM investment was unexpected despite being clearly stated in the SHA. VRL reversed its story on KCM. It will now borrow at the parent level to fund a cash-draining asset it previously claimed would be self-funded. Management cited an “S-1 silent period” to avoid releasing KCM financials. No S-1 of CIK exists. The explanation doesn’t hold.

December 8, 2025 – On December 5, 2025, Vedanta Resources Limited (VRL) released its H1 FY26 earnings. The headline consolidated numbers mask the reality: VRL PropCo posted its worst half-year performance on record. To isolate credit risk, Viceroy subtracted VEDL’s H1 FY26 consolidated results from VRL’s figures to analyze the PropCo earnings directly. VRL PropCo delivered its worst half-year on record in H1 FY26, with negative earnings, negative liquidity and negative free cash flow. PropCo reported a $1,261m net loss to owners, confirming that the holding structure cannot generate sustainable earnings. Liquidity deteriorated sharply, with a $549m free cash flow loss, driven largely by dividends to non-controlling interests. KCM reported a $192m operating loss and spending only $8m on its key expansion project despite receiving $346m in funding. Depreciation of $186m indicates continued asset shrinkage. VRL PropCo gross debt fell by $689, but this was offset by a $370m increase in net debt at the consolidated level, meaning the group is merely shifting leverage between entities rather than deleveraging

December 5, 2025 – Vedanta Limited (VEDL) has committed to a 100% cash acquisition of Incab Industries Limited (Incab) for ₹577 crore ($64m), payable within 90 days and the significant cost of making the facilities operational. The acquisition adds to Vedanta Resources Limited’s existing liquidity crisis, already strained by the $206m payment obligation under the KCM Shareholders Agreement due December 31, 2025. Despite no active operations, obsolete plant infrastructure, and a history of fires and sabotage, VEDL is paying more than 5x prior bids for Incab. Bondholders should view this as a further threat to debt servicing capacity. Management at VEDL and VRL have consistently stated that VRL’s interest and maturities, as well as its investment commitments at KCM, will be handled by dividends and brand fees from VEDL.  Per management statements and the KCM agreement, VRL requires: $270m – $280m in H2 FY26 $500m in maturities in FY27 $400m in interest in FY27 $270m in investment in KCM in FY27 Vedanta just burned ₹577 crore ($64m) on Incab, a non-operational, loss-making asset, plus significant future capex obligations to return the assets to operation. This is cash that cannot be upstreamed to VRL, who has no alternative source of liquidity. This is a textbook liquidity drain at the worst possible time.

December 2, 2025 - On November 28, 2025, it was reported that Vedanta Limited’s (VEDL) subsidiary ESL Steel (ESL) will raise ₹2,000 crore ($223m) through 10%-12% non-convertible debentures being marketed as routine corporate refinancing. This raise lands days before VEDL’s parent Vedanta Resources Ltd (VRL) must meet its $206m December funding obligation for Konkola Copper Mines (KCM), funds it does not have. Vedanta is raising debt at ESL precisely because ESL cannot repay or service it. ESL is now a disposable funding vehicle which allows the Group to funnel the proceeds upstream to meet VRL’s liquidity deadlines. The Group’s much-promoted deleveraging strategy has collapsed.

November 27, 2025 - On November 13, 2025, Viceroy sent a letter to the Prime Minister’s Office of India, copied to the Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Home Affairs, and Enforcement Directorate, detailing:The diversion of over $1.5b from Indian subsidiaries to offshore Vedanta entities under sham service agreements.Apparent violations of FEMA, SEBI, and related party governance standards.The urgent need to freeze cross border payments and investigate VRL’s financial practices.We believe these actions are critical to protect India’s public assets and VEDL, HZL and BALCO's minority shareholders.

November 25, 2025 – Viceroy has obtained a copy of the 2023 Shareholder Agreement (SHA) between Vedanta Resources Limited (VRL) and ZCCM. The SHA shows that VRL is deliberately misleading bondholders, analysts and rating agencies about their contractual obligations to fund KCM. VRL management has emphatically stated there is no funding requirement for KCM from VRL in the medium term. This is categorically untrue: $206m is due by December 31, 2025 with a further $270m in 2026. This is a catch 22: either VRL is lying to the Zambian government, or it is misleading the market. In stark contrast to affirmations provided to investors and ratings agencies: VRL must continue funding KCM to the tune of hundreds of millions of dollars in the near-term. This is unfortunate for VEDL shareholders, who will inevitably be footing the bill. Vedanta is charging unlawful extra interest on $1bn in shareholder loans to KCM, in breach of the SHA's cost-of-funding cap. VRL is using its stake in Vedanta Limited (VEDL), which is already fully pledged, as de-facto collateral.

November 18, 2025 - Over seven years, Vedanta Group incinerated more than $650m on Avanstrate Inc, a business it knew was dying when it bought the glass substrate manufacturer. Marketed as a strategic entry into display manufacturing, the acquisition was in reality a distressed salvage operation dressed up as strategy. Avanstrate has generated persistent losses, consumed shareholder capital, and ultimately left Vedanta holding a structurally insolvent business with no commercial future. The business was overseen throughout this period by Akarsh Hebbar, managing director of Avanstrate and Vedanta’s global head of display and semiconductor operations, a role he held by virtue of being group chairman Anil Agarwal’s son-in-law rather than any track record in the sector This report traces the financial unraveling of Avanstrate, the misrepresentations that masked its decline, and the structural conflicts of interest that enabled it.

November 10, 2025 – Viceroy has obtained the Enforcement Directorate’s summons, dated June 28, 2023, compelling Vedanta Limited’s Chief Financial Officer to appear in person and produce detailed documentation of royalty payments, intercompany loans, and guarantee fees made to VRL between 2017 and 2023. The summons was issued regarding the Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999, a formal enforcement action, not a routine inquiry. In 2023 Vedanta assured regulators that services were rendered from a functional London office. They helped the Company escape with a relatively light consequence: a $123m rebate In 2025, the ED are investigating Vedanta again. Vedanta has since admitted that there is no London office, and services are rendered in India by Vedanta Limited. We were informed by former employees that the fee for those services is ~$200,000 per annum. This time regulators are unlikely to accept Vedanta’s token compliance to justify hundreds of millions in overseas payments.

November 7, 2025 – On November 6, 2025, the Financial Times reported that Vedanta Resources Limited (VRL) had transferred its interest in Konkola Copper Mines (KCM) to a US entity, CopperTech Metals. This confirms Viceroy’s previous concerns that VRL could not meet its funding commitments and are now trying to sell the problem to someone else. This announcement is more likely designed to hide a $1b hole in VRL’s deleveraging strategy and delay Zambian enforcement ahead of a $206m investment due in December. VRL has floated and abandoned KCM fundraising schemes before including an IPO, stake sale, and debt raise. VRL doesn’t have a $1.5b IPO plan. It has a $2m marketing plan focused on: Distracting bondholders and ratings agencies from the $1b black hole in their deleveraging strategy. The CopperTech IPO maintains the illusion of progress, while no capital has been raised. Delaying action from ZCCM and the Zambian government as VRL faces a $206m investment deadline it has not met. US listing hype is intended to ward off enforcement or repossession. Misrepresenting a Zambian asset, owned by a UK-domiciled conglomerate directed by and Indian national as somehow critical to US mineral security. If CopperTech Metals ever lists, we will pre-emptively issue a sell rating on the stock.