MiMedx – Channel-Stuffing: Hard Evidence

Viceroy has previously published on MiMedx detailing its dubious hiring practices, connections to related party employee owned distributors, improper government filings and undisclosed SEC investigation.

PDF Download Link

Following publication of our first report, MiMedx held an investor conference call on September 21st where management knowingly made false statements to their investors and the general public. MiMedx published a rebuttal to Viceroy’s second report, which is posted to the front page of the MiMedx website, linked to a Box account, and not on company letterhead.

We believe this represents a misaligned focus between the organization’s strategy in crisis control and Pete Petit’s systematic attempts to clear his name and slander Viceroy’s investigations.

Many former MiMedx employees that are not in legal conflict with MiMedx have reached out to Viceroy to provide information and corroboration of our investigations. All whistleblowers are extremely fearful of physical and legal retribution from MiMedx. They have provided us with images, statements and further information about the company’s channel stuffing practices, executive impropriety and lack of disclosure.


MiMedx – Part 2 – The same old story; Mimedx’s response is typical of companies trying to cover their tracks and is unacceptable.

MiMedx cherry-picked a handful of bulls for the September 21 call last week, restricting access for their own investors and others with an interest in the events that transpired on the week ending September 22, 2017. During the call, analysts asked pertinent questions that remain substantially unanswered. To assist investors, we’ve compiled a list of items that were conveniently ignored, avoided or even blatantly misrepresented.

PDF Report Download

Over the last week, MiMedx has:

  • Dismissed “Deceptive Short Seller Reports”, including Viceroy’s, which presented evidence in the form of a withheld FOIA request suggesting that MiMedx was the subject of an undisclosed SEC enforcement investigation.
  • Announced that MiMedx are complying with an SEC subpoena, thus subject to an SEC investigation.
  • Failed to formally announce to the market that they are a subject of an SEC investigation. Viceroy requested management confirm whether it will fulfill their regulatory requirements by filing an 8-K in relation to an ongoing SEC investigation within the four days of becoming aware of it. If they have not filed an 8-K within 4 days of becoming aware of an SEC investigation, they are in breach of withholding material information from the investing public.
  • Been announced as the subject of an investigation by two securities litigation firms: Block & Leviton and Bragar Eagel & Squire, P.C. Both firms announced it had commenced investigations into a class action on behalf of MiMedx shareholders on September 22 and 25, 2017 respectively for not disclosing they were under SEC investigation, amongst other things.
  • Backdated government FAR & DFARS certification records as far as 2013 which were previously filled out by an employee, Don Ayers – who no longer worked at MiMedx at the time of certification – with Kimberley Durgan – who only commenced employment with MiMedx in 2014.
  • Backdated FAR & DFARs certifications remained signed with the authority of VP Brent Miller, whose LinkedIn status as of May 2017 is ‘Officially Retired’, and thus had no authority within MiMedx at the time of the amendments.
  • Announced it had come to a settlement of a confidential lawsuit with terminated employee Hal Purdy, a move we believe serves only to distract from the issues raised in our report which as yet go unacknowledged and undiscussed by the company.

MiMedx – MiMedx’s (NASDAQ:MDXG) employment of kickback & bribery scheme inducers makes it uninvestable.

Viceroy Research uncovered substantial previously-unreported data evidencing an incestuous hiring policy from a kickback & bribery scheme, a possible SEC enforcement investigation, and indications of channel stuffing.

  • Sean McCormack – MiMedx’s “New Market Initiatives Director” – was an instrumental figure in Advanced BioHealing’s kickback and bribery inducement scheme, which resulted in the largest settlement of a False Claims Act breach to date: US$350m settlement, and a US$600m+ write-down by Shire. At least 54 Advanced BioHealing alumnus have been identified by Viceroy within MiMedx’s sales force including at least 15 in senior employment positions.
  • A FOIA request was withheld by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) suggesting MiMedx is the target of an undisclosed SEC enforcement investigation.
  • Former employees-turned whistleblowers accused MiMedx of aggressive channel-stuffing practices and improper revenue recognition policies. Their statement named many ex-Advanced BioHealing employees. Despite the fact these allegations having been withdrawn, Viceroy’s analysis found evidence supporting these claims in MiMedx’s financial accounts – there’s no smoke without fire.
  • MiMedx’s SAM compliance certification was filled out by Don Ayers, who was no longer employed by MiMedx at the time the forms were signed.

Download Report PDF


Neuroderm – 田辺三菱には日本企業による悲惨な買収案件の列に加わる可能性のあるニューロダーム買収を再検討する機会が残されている.


Neuroderm – 田辺三菱製薬は大きな間違いを犯している: ニューロダームが無価値であると考える理由


  • ニューロダームは同社の持続皮下注投与ポンプ薬剤ND0612の市場規模、臨床試験の適切性有効性について不正確な説明をしている。
  • 既にアッヴィ社のDuopa/Duodopaのポンプ薬剤が市場で確立されている。同薬剤は有害事象の発現率が圧倒的に低く適切な被験者群を対象とした臨床試験が行われ、ニューロダームのように、臨床試験の結果を強化するための補助的な経口治療薬であるレボドパもしくはエンタカポンに依存していない。
  • ニューロダームは欧米におけるND0612のターゲット市場規模を患者数最大35万人としている。より優れたアッヴィ社のポンプ薬剤も同じ市場をターゲットとしているが、患者数は3,500人にとどまっている。
  • ND0612は進行期パーキンソン病患者を対象としているが、その有効性試験は、効果を得るために必要な有効成分用量が大幅に少なくて済む早期パーキンソン病患者を対象に実施された。弊社は、ND0612の試験が適切かつ的を射た被験者群を対象として実施されるよう、米食品医薬品局(FDA)が第3相試験を慎重に評価すると考えている
  • ニューロダームのND0612投与ポンプは、汎用部品から構成されるため、独自の研究開発品としての価値はゼロである
  • 現在ND0612については、有効性ではなく生物学的同等性についてのみ試験が行われている。これにより、より迅速なFDAの承認へとつながるかも知れないが、田辺三菱のニューロダームの買収の目的は技術のためである。田辺三菱は、ニューロダームの研究開発の価値をも含めて当買収を行おうとしているが、この妥協(生物学的同等試験のみを実施している)はニューロダームの研究開発の価値の低さを反映するものである。



Viceroyはニューロダームの評価額を直近の簿価 1株当たり4.87ドル以下、企業価値では0ドルと見ている



Viceroyは、ニューロダームの評価額を直近の簿価1億3千万ドル以下、もしくは1株 当たり4.87ドルと見ており、ニューロダームの現金の手持ち高にも相当する。これは、企業価値0ドル、田辺三菱の提案取得価格と比べて88%のディスカウントを意味する

田辺三菱とその株主、資本を提供している金融機関は、この案件から手を引くべきである。弊社はニューロダームの薬剤は投資に値するものではなく、買収は田辺三菱にはなんらリターンをもたらさないと考えている。このお粗末なデューデリジェンスは、東芝のグループ会社ウェスティングハウス社によるCB&I ストーン&ウェブスター社の買収で後に61億ドルの減損となった買収を彷彿させる。

ニューロダーム(NASDAQ上場、ティッカーコード : NDRM)は、臨床試験段階にある製薬会社であり、主にパーキンソン病の症状の治療薬の開発に携わっている。具体的には、ND0612の製品群である。

臨床試験や医薬データによると、ND0612H もND0612L も十分なレボドパを提供できず、パーキンソン病の単独治療薬として機能できない



  1. ND0612のデリバリーシステムに関する有害事象の発現頻度が高い
  2. 臨床試験の対象群は、ニューロダームの対象市場よりも早期のパーキンソン病患者であり、その結果、良好な臨床結果が得られた
  3. 有効性試験では必要に応じて経口レボドパが使用され、そもそも試験の結果が有効なのか疑問が生じている
  4. 16時間の外来患者の結果が、8時間の入院患者の結果から推測されており、他にもデータマイニング(都合のいい情報を見つけ出す)による結果があるのではないかという懸念が生じている
  5. 真の盲検試験が実施されていない






  1. 既に同様な薬剤が存在すること、価格が高いこと、有害事象の発現頻度が高いことから、医療従事者ならびにパーキンソン病患者は処方/使用を躊躇するものと思われる
  2. ニューロダームの製品はFDA承認の取得が困難となる可能性がある
  3. 競合製品との生物学的同等性を示すため、競合相手の経口LD/CD製品を併用しなければならない市場では、売上に苦戦を強いられると思われる。ニューロダームの製品の計画は理にかなっていない
  4. ニューロダームの製品が直接の競合製品をしのぐことは難しいだろう




Neuroderm – Mitsubishi Tanabe is making a huge mistake: Why we believe that Neuroderm (NASDAQ:NDRM) is a lemon.

Neuroderm PDF Report Download

We believe that Mitsubishi Tanabe and its board need to immediately put a hold on the Neuroderm acquisition. We don’t know what representations have been made to Mitsubishi Tanabe by Neuroderm or others pushing this acquisition, but our research findings demonstrate the following:

  • Neuroderm has misrepresented the SIZE of the market, the RELEVANCE of their clinical study, and the EFFECTIVENESS of their ND0612 pump-delivered drug.
  • AbbVie’s Duopa/Duodopa pump is already ESTABLISHED in the market, has a SUBSTANTIALLY LOWER adverse effect rate, conducted its trials on an APPROPRIATE subject pool, and did not rely on SUPPLEMENTARY oral levodopa or entacapone, to boost its clinical trial results, unlike Neuroderm.
  • Neuroderm claims the size of ND0612’s target market across the USA and EU is ~350,000 patients. AbbVie’s superior pump has targeted the SAME market, only capturing ~3,500 patients.
  • The ND0612 drug is marketed towards ADVANCED stage Parkinson’s sufferers, however the efficacy study for the drug was conducted on EARLY stage Parkinson’s sufferers, which require substantially lower doses of the active drug component in order to be effective. We believe the FDA will closely review the stage 3 trials to ensure ND0612 is tested on an APPROPRIATE and RELEVANT subject pool.
  • Neuroderm’s ND0612 delivery pump is made up of GENERIC COMPONENTS and presents ZERO R&D proprietary value.
  • ND0612 is now only being tested for bioequivalence, not efficacy. While this may lead to a speedier FDA approved drug, Mitsubishi Tanabe is meant to be buying Neuroderm for its TECHNOLOGY. We see this concession as further evidence of Neuroderm’s weak R&D value, which Mitsubishi Tanabe thought it was buying with this acquisition.


Caesarstone – Otzar Rebuttal

  • Viceroy find Otzar Capital’s ties to one of Israel’s larger investment relations & public relations groups concerning, especially considering the potential connections between the IR/PR and Otzar’s reports. We have provided a portfolio of evidence in this regard to the SEC.
  • Viceroy have concerns that the Investors may have entered into such investments with what appears to be a lack of disclosure.
  • Otzar’s report completely glosses over significant arguments made in our first report, including the pending silicosis class action, disappearing dividends and stock buybacks and nonsensical market data.
  • Otzar had to go all the way to suburban Miami to meet a Lowe’s retailer that sold Caesarstone’s transform. Congratulations, you got us.
  • Otzar’s most convincing arguments: our misuse of Cosentino’s major subsidiary vs the consolidated group accounts (which we are still unable to verify but will give the benefit of the doubt) adds to our thesis. Competitor margins in the consolidated numbers presented by Otzar are even smaller than Viceroy’s previous figures, making Caesarstone’s margins even more outrageous and enforcing our belief that Caesarstone’s costs are understated.
  • Otzar’s management and supplier derived volume calculations imply that either resellers are operating on ~300% mark-ups or Caesarstone’s facilities are producing well below capacity, yet amazingly they look to be correct! If this is the case, why build more lines?

CSTE – Otzar Rebuttal PDF Download Link

Caesarstone – Nothing on the Counter.

  • CSTE’s major revenue growth product, marketed as a collaboration with Lowe’s, is not for sale according to Lowe’s Customer Services and store checks. This is contrary sell-side forecasts highlighting this as a growth driver.
  • Of CSTE’s listed sales agents, there is a growing percentage no longer sell (or have never sold) CSTE products, switching to higher margin products. Agents who sell CSTE are charging a higher retail price than consumers pay at IKEA for identical products. Ikea countertops include free installation!
  • We believe CSTE’s inventory should be revised materially downwards to reflect decreasing average selling prices within their larger customers.
  • SEC enquiries into CSTE revenue growth factors inconsistently addressed by management. The major revenue variance factor, increased average selling price, is not supported by channel checks which show prices decreasing at major customers/outlets.
  • Competitor analysis suggests CSTE are either not maintaining machinery adequately or that machinery is severely under utilized.
  • CSTE has consistently missed guidance; a theme we identify and is unlikely to change.
  • Shareholder friendly programmes discontinued. CSTE is now a negative earnings growth vehicle with no payout policy.

Caeserstone Report PDF Download

Quintis Limited (ASX:QIN) – formerly TFS Corporation Limited – Money Doesn’t Grow on Trees

The saying goes, money doesn’t grow on trees..

  • Bogus sales channels.
  • Directors skimming cash through round robin scheme, which concurrently allows Quintis to artificially boost sales.
  • Fictional institutional sales, Quintis books revenues which are
    intermittently used to gain access to debt finance, before being written off.
  • Debt finance used to engage in Ponzi-like behavior.
  • Viceroy’s price target for Quintis is $0. The scenario is reminiscent of historical MIS ventures such as Timbercorp and Great Southern, both of which are now defunct(consensus with Glaucus Research Group).

Quintis Limited Report Download